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ABSTRACT 
 
In sports discourse, the relationship between athletics and technology is often 
paradoxical. On the one hand, modern sports rely on technology at every level, from 
training and tracking of players to the equipment and apparel used by athletes to the 
game strategies and playing fields themselves. Nearly all of these technologies are 
intended to increase athletic performance on some level. And yet, certain performance 
enhancement technologies can be criticized for being antithetical to the spirit of sports, 
which is framed as being a strictly natural and pure human endeavor.  
 Using a rhetorical-cultural methodological approach, popular sports discourse is 
analyzed to investigate how arguments in contested spaces between sports and 
technologies get (re)negotiated and (re)articulated to fit within a sports social language 
that emphasizes “pure” and “natural” ideals of sport. This often results in a dichotomy 
where the sport/technology relationship is either black boxed, thus being subsumed in 
the sport social language and becoming transparent and the relationships unarticulated, 
or the technology is regulated out of the sport through rules and bans. The reason for 
this articulation is attributed in large part to the deep humanism embedded in the sport 
social language. How a shift to a posthuman perspective would effect sports discourse 
is explored.  
 These conclusions about underlying values in sports discourse lead to the 
formation of a new theoretical framework called disciplinary mythologies. Building off of 
Foucault’s disciplinary power, Scott’s disciplinary rhetorics, and Barthe’s mythologies, 
disciplinary mythologies are discrete units of persuasion that both construct and 
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constitute claims by drawing upon layered narratives and shifting associations that lose 
their context when entering the realm of myth. Two specific disciplinary mythologies are 
discussed—the level-playing-field topos and the nostalgia enthymeme—and it is shown 
how sports discourse often draws upon them to shape arguments and actions.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Where does the body end and the technology begin? Where is the line between 
natural and artificial? 
In the world of high-performance athletics, these are not questions of simple 
demarcation; they are questions that interrogate the heart of self, identity, and 
perception, and as I will show, they have real-world implications on sports performance.   
Controversy and debate are nothing new to sports, and the arguments expressed 
in newspapers, locker rooms, and around water coolers address a wide range of 
issues—from whether an officiating call was justified to who the best player of all time 
was to which team is best positioned to win the next championship. One particularly 
contentious debate that occurs in various forms throughout most sports is how to rectify 
technology’s role in what is generally mythologized as a strictly human endeavor. A 
simple survey of the sports landscape reveals relationships between sport and 
technology that are often confusing or contradictory. This is a world where injecting 
substances into the body is demonized for being unnatural while at the same time using 
advanced computer modeling, algorithms, and analytics is not only considered 
acceptable, but also a necessary part of optimizing human performance; where using a 
natural substance like caffeine has been heavily restricted at times while a synthetic 
substance like Gatorade is consumed en masse; where in one sport a uniform can be 
labeled as technological doping while the same technology in another sport is accepted 
with little reservation. What started me on this line of inquiry was what I believed at first 
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to be a simple question: Why are some technologies accepted into the sporting world 
with little to no critical debate while others are hotly contested and seen as parasitic in 
an otherwise natural endeavor? However, this is not a question that can be answered 
simply. The reasons behind it stem from deep-rooted notions about the nature of 
competition.  
The focus of my analysis is on Performance Enhancement Technologies in 
Sports (PETs), and by technology I am referring to everything from the athletic 
shoes/clothing/equipment we use to the nutrients/supplements/drugs we consume to 
the scientifically based training techniques/diets we follow in an effort to improve athletic 
performance. In other words, I am considering technology to be anything (including 
objects, data, theories, systems) that has its basis in empirical/experiential science and 
extends a human’s capabilities and senses. The definition I am using is not unique; 
however, the fact that I am articulating the definition is a departure from the dominant 
criticism about PETs in sports. Typically, technology is referred to generally. For 
instance, in the recent collection Performance-Enhancing Technologies in Sports 
(Murray, Maschke, and Wasunna, 2009) not once in any of the 13 separate articles is 
the concept of technologies defined despite the fact that every article uses the term 
repeatedly. Additionally, an important distinction between my analysis of PETs and the 
majority of other criticism on the subject is that I am purposely drawing examples from 
technologies that are not performance-enhancement drugs in sports (PEDs). Again, if 
we use the Murray text as a representative example of the types of research in this field, 
we would think that a book titled Performance-Enhancing Technologies in Sports would 
draw upon a variety of technologies to analyze. However, in all but one article, 
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“technologies” is used primarily to discuss a type of PED. The one exception is an 
article that deals with the concept of fairness and does not address any technologies 
specifically. Although no one would argue that illegal substances (e.g., anabolic steroids 
and blood doping) are the only performance enhancers in sports, they have dominated 
the conversations about PETs so much that other technologies (e.g., game equipment, 
apparel, nutritional supplements, science-backed training programs, advanced 
equipment used for healing, recovery, and training, etc.), many of which have a far 
greater effect on actual performance, have been overlooked, ignored, or accepted with 
minimal resistance by both research communities and the general public.  
Technology plays a major role in modern sport, yet it can also remain in the 
background; in some cases society seems to deliberately overlook technology’s role 
through a discursive emphasis on the body—the “natural”—over the human-made when 
it comes to human competition. However, there are moments when technology exerts 
its presence, often within a haze of controversy and uproar. My project will look at these 
contested nodes where technology and sport seem to challenge each other, and I will 
explore what these moments tell us about our underlying assumptions, about our 
perspectives and priorities.  
Personally, I am a huge sports fan and consider myself athletic (if not an athlete), 
so this topic naturally appeals to me. But more than my attraction toward competition, I 
am drawn to the sports discourse and practices because of their seeming contradictory 
and shifting stances toward technology—modern sports rely so heavily on technology 
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but also sometimes work to elide this fact. In many sports discourses1, human body 
and human spirit reign supreme, skill and talent are considered natural, even while 
bodies, skills, and talent depend on using the most advanced technology and 
techniques. If technology is seen to cross an illusory and shifting boundary—whether it 
is steroids or equipment or bodily modifications—its use can be viewed as unfair or 
otherwise out of bounds. 
 
Current Research & Methodology 
 
While the topic of performance enhancement technology appears to be a very 
large and encompassing area, the research that has been conducted on this issue as it 
applies to sport comes out of discourse groups with discrete lines of inquiry. Highlighting 
these lines of inquiry reveal significant gaps in the scholarship. Although there is some 
limited intermingling and blending between groups, the stakeholders in this conversation 
generally remain separate (i.e., you don’t have one voice speaking from a position of 
authority in more than one group) and come from one of three arenas: medical science, 
social science/academia, and sports culture. The most homogeneous of the three 
groups is the medical science, which is composed primarily of medical doctors and 
sports-science doctors (generally M.D.’s, but it also includes Ph.D.’s that have a clinical 
focus). Although the empirical research from this group is routinely drawn upon for 
                                                        
1 Of course, there is not one sports discourse, and even to claim that each sport has 
its own unified discourse is misleading. I will use the term “sports discourse” in 
this project for expediency sake to refer to conversations relating to sports 
rhetoric, but I am in no way attempting to claim there is an expansive, monolithic 
sports discourse. In Chapter 2, I will more clearly articulate how I am applying this 
term and what does or does not fit well within it.  
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arguments that emerge from either social science or popular media, it is much less 
common for someone from the medical science to speak from a position within either of 
the other two groups, with the occasional exception of a sports-science Ph.D. publishing 
within a social science venue. The social-science group is composed mainly of scholars 
from various disciplines within social science, especially sociologists, anthropologists, 
and sports ethicists. Their scholarship is published primarily through academic journals 
or academic presses. The last group, and the most heterogeneous one, speaks from a 
position within sports culture. Sports writers/columnists make up the largest percentage 
of this group, but it also includes a variety of other stakeholders within the sports 
industry, including (but not limited to) current and former athletes, sport manufacturing 
entities, team ownership/administration, mainstream media outlets, governmental 
bodies/policymakers, and sports enthusiasts.  
As I commented on earlier, PETs as a collected artifact of study—inclusive of all 
technologies, not just PEDs—has received little critical attention. While there is 
extensive discourse about one aspect of PETs—namely steroids2—there is a dearth of 
critical research on other performance technologies (i.e., footwear, Gatorade, clothing, 
equipment, training/diet techniques, etc.). Discourse on steroids flows from numerous 
disciplines—medicine, sociology, sports science, anthropology, political science/public 
policy, journalism and others—but when it comes to other PETs, research comes 
almost exclusively from sports science. Since the research aims and publication 
                                                        
2 Of course, “steroids” is the popular term that usually applies to several different 
pharmaceuticals including anabolic steroids (as opposed to corticosteroids), red blood 
cell transfusion or recombinant human erythropoietin (blood doping), and now 
potentials for “gene doping.” 
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opportunities for sports-science scholars generally come from empirical research, even 
when they do investigate other PETs, the scope of such projects is restricted to testing 
the effectiveness of a technology on performance (i.e., how much of a performance 
increase will you get from a new shoe design, etc.), and seldom do they investigate the 
social implications of a technology on the sport or look at PETs in a broader context3.  
Generally speaking, steroids seem to be a black hole in sports discourse, drawing all 
the research and cultural attention toward them. It is difficult to escape the gravitational 
pull that steroids have on the PETs discussion since most of the lines of inquiry are 
aimed at that particular controversial subject.   
 
What Are the Effects of Using PETs (Steroids)? 
 
The vast majority of empirical research on how PETs, and steroids in particular, 
affect the human body and athletic performance comes from medical research. Like 
most research conducted within a medical context, the research generally remains 
limited to reporting on the specific study/experiment findings. Articles rarely discuss 
broader social implications of steroid use. However, the findings from this research are 
often taken up by both social science and popular-culture sources in order to make 
arguments about the social implications of steroid use. For the most part, this group of 
research will only be discussed in my project tangentially. Since my concern is how 
                                                        
3 We might view other body modification or performance enhancement technologies that 
are non-sport related as a distant cousin of this first branch. Issues such as 
cosmetic surgery, sexual enhancement, performance enhancement as a result of physical 
loss due to age or injury, creativity or mental-focus improvement, etc. have been 
examined extensively by sociologists and other social scientists.  
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definitions and understandings get rhetorically negotiated, the actual medical research 
is less of a focus for my project.  
That being said, the medical research on steroids is far less definitive than one 
may think. Since there are serious legal and ethical restrictions to conducting any kind 
of study using illegal/banned substances in a sporting context, it is impossible to 
develop any kind of supportable consensus on the actual performance-enhancing 
effects or the health risks to athletes4.  According to Smith et al., “there remains an 
absence of reliable evidence documenting the adverse effects of many performance-
enhancing drugs as well as reliable data about the prevalence of their use in sport” 
(2010). What limited research there is has drawn a wide variety of conclusions, 
including many who argue that anabolic steroids specifically have little effect on actual 
performance, yet the dominant social image is that injecting steroids can turn a normal 
human into a superhuman.  
Another major component of the medical research is in the field of testing for 
performance enhancers. Again, the scholarship is fairly rich on this subject, and most of 
it comes out of medical journals. However, unlike the first distinction I drew in the 
medical research, testing is where medicine and public policy tend to intermingle. For 
instance, “Gene Doping: The Hype and the Harm,” discusses not only challenges to 
testing for genetic manipulation for performance enhancement, but it also addresses the 
                                                        
4 Various kinds of steroids have been approved for use outside of sports competition, 
so the health effects for “normal” use have been studied. However, the research on the 
effects during intense competition is limited (Yesalis, Kopstein, & Bahrke, 2001). The 
other issue is that many of the risks associated with steroids come from their misuse, 
just like any other pharmaceutical. There is a very different set of risks when the 
substance is administered and monitored by a physician, but since steroids are banned 
in professional sports, the vast majority of steroid use in this context is done 
without physician administration or monitoring.  
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need for such testing measures in order to maintain a “level playing field” in competitive 
sports (McKanna and Toriello, 2010). These article tend to accept without question the 
underlying premise that steroids (and other performance enhancers, but they rarely 
stray from steroids) need to be banned from sports; therefore, they will serve as a texts 
to apply a rhetorical-cultural lens and question why these assumptions are made to 
begin with.  
 
How Do PETs Impact Society & Sports? 
 
Questions about how PETs impact society or specific social groups come mainly 
from social science scholars. Sociology, Anthropology, Sports Science and Philosophy 
departments (often in the form of sports ethics or sports law courses) have examined 
social attitudes toward steroids, especially in groups perceived to be at risk such as 
weight lifters and teenagers. For instance, articles in the journals Sport, Ethics and 
Philosophy and Sport in Society often address the issue of steroids and other 
performance enhancers from a critical position, questioning why and how social 
opinions are formed and perpetuated. One such article out of the latter journal, 
“Attitudes towards use of performance-enhancing substances and body modification 
techniques: A comparison between elite athletes and the general public,” (Breivik, 
Gunnar, Hanstad, Dag Vidar and Loland, 2009) both provides valuable primary 
research in the form of survey data and engages in a useful dialogue about the unclear 
assumptions that inform social opinions on various performance enhancing 
technologies. Similarly, Susan Sherwin’s article in Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, 
 9 
“Genetic enhancement, sports and relational autonomy” (2007) provides similar data 
and dialogue on attitudes toward performance enhancers. However, even the 
sociological studies that examine attitudes toward steroids tend to isolate them from a 
larger context of PETs. And despite coming from social sciences, scholars have rarely 
examined how language and discourse help to shape these perceptions, which will be a 
primary focus in my research.  
Although there are some rich materials coming out of Sociology research, there is 
also less critical work that seems to accept the same assumptions that we see in the 
steroid-testing field. “Effects of mass communication on attitudes toward anabolic 
steroids: an analysis of high school seniors,” (Denham, 2006), for example, attempts to 
take the survey data collected and use it to suggest ways to improve anti-steroid 
educational material. That steroids and other performance enhancers need to be 
banned remains an underlying and unquestioned assumption in the article. Work such 
as this will not inform my argument but will be useful as a target to apply a rhetorical 
analysis to and examine the social understandings that are being negotiated within the 
discourse, even scholarly discourse.  
Regarding how steroids affect sports themselves, most of the commentary comes 
from popular media. Of course, a lot has been written about steroids in the popular 
media, especially sports journalism, and these materials are just as important, if not 
more so, when it comes to using rhetorical analysis to investigate the social 
(un)conscious regarding PET. Central to popular media are the sports figures implicated 
or proven to have used steroids during competition. Athletes, fans, sports and news 
commentators, social critics, politicians and others have all weighed in on this issue, 
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most often condemning the use of steroids and those who use them. The arguments 
are a wealth of primary source material for rhetorical analysis, especially since they tend 
to include these four claims differently elaborated: 
o Steroids are dangerous to the user’s health  
o Steroids threaten the integrity of the game and the notion of a “level playing field” 
o Steroids are a violation of the rules and therefore cheating 
o Teenagers look up to athletes, so if athletes are perceived to use steroids, youth 
will be more likely to use them.  
Additionally, books written by or about athletes who have used steroids have moved 
up recent best-seller lists. Jose Canseco’s Juiced: Wild Times, Rampant ‘Roids, Smash 
Hits, and How Baseball Got Big (2006) and Shaun Assael’s Steroid Nation: Juiced 
Home Run Totals, Anti-Aging Miracles, and a Hercules in Every High School: The 
Secret History of America’s True Drug Addition (2007) are just two examples of a bevy 
of popular texts that address the “era of steroids,” primarily in baseball, cycling, and 
weight lifting. Most of these works are historical or biographical in nature, and they are 
far from critical, but they form a significant part of the social dialogue about steroids.  
 
What Should Be Done About PETs in Sports? 
 
Again, most of the discourse about how to react toward steroids and other PETs 
comes from popular media. Whether we are talking about “doping” or new performance 
equipment/training techniques, there are a number of sports writers, athletes, and fans 
ready to comment on the subject and what should be done about it. Additionally, public 
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policy has weighed in on the issue of steroids and how to regulate them. For the most 
part, in all of these situations, arguments simply replicate the underlying assumptions 
about steroids. The most high-profile example of this is the Congressional hearings 
about steroid use in Major League Baseball. Out of those hearings came the Mitchell 
Report, a government-ordered report that looks mainly at the history behind steroid use 
in baseball but also makes arguments about why steroids need to be addressed in 
professional sports.  
 
Multiple Gaps & Methodology 
 
Clearly, even within discussions of steroids, there are some significant critical 
gaps in the scholarship. However, as I have stated previously, the bigger gap is in the 
larger context of performance-enhancement technologies in sports as a whole. Although 
much of this literature review has focused on the banned-substance issues within 
sports, my project will draw from a much larger pool of PETs as examples and case 
studies. Texts that explore beyond the boundaries of steroids and other banned 
practices in order to look at a wider range of performance enhancement are few and far 
between, and it is to this group that I hope to make the largest contribution. Despite the 
scarcity of scholarship here, there are a few texts of note that will factor significantly into 
my own research (Shogan, 1999; Pronger, 2002; Magdalinski, 2009).  All of these texts 
apply cultural analysis and critical theory to the larger realm of performance 
enhancement in sports/athletics, which is what I will do as well. However, my project will 
apply a more overtly rhetorical lens to PETs, something that has not been done before. 
 12 
The rhetoric of health/body/medicine addresses similar questions since it examines 
rhetoric associated with human bodies, but even though there is a rich and diverse 
scholarship within this field, no one has discussed in any kind of depth the rhetoric 
associated with PETs. Yet, arguments about PETs within sports culture are ripe for 
rhetorical analysis. This is an area of unclear and shifting understandings, a place 
where rules, regulations, definitions, and social taboos prescribe certain arguments and 
technologies but proscribe others. Premises underlying these arguments about what is 
acceptable and what is prohibited are rarely articulated, and when they are, the 
premises tend to perpetuate the same “naturalistic,” unreflective arguments. Just like 
any other controversial issue, the arguments made in support/opposition not only 
function to define the boundaries of a topic but also inform social understandings. PETs 
are a complex topic, and social understanding of them is being negotiated by various 
discourse communities—popular sports culture, politicians, athletes, sports 
professionals, educators, sociologists, doctors, etc. The advantage rhetorical analysis 
has over other frameworks is that it can track and unpack the language used to 
construct these shifting discourses through multiple disciplines, stakeholders, and 
mediums. This kind of border crossing is necessary since our attitudes toward PETs are 
formed through cumulative communicative force—the weight of all the arguments made 
by all the discourses over time rather than by any one particular group’s voice. How we 
perceive and adapt to PETs is shaped far more by the language and assumptions used 
to characterize and (ultimately) understand them than it is on any kind of empirical data. 
Rhetorical analysis is ideally suited for this kind of project.   
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My goal will be to provide a clearer understanding of how we as a society 
perceive PETs and what those perceptions say about our assumptions and priorities, 
but I also want to argue for a more nuanced and posthuman approach to PETs as we 
move forward. To this point, few have analyzed sports using a discretely posthuman 
approach, and to my knowledge, no one has applied Katherine Hayle’s posthuman lens 
to sports as I intend to do. Although posthumanism can mean slightly different things to 
different people, at its core is a questioning of what we consider naturally human as well 
as an investigation of the nature and existence of borders between the human and other 
things (i.e. the animal, the machine, the digital, the social, etc.). Descartes’s humanism 
posits that there is an essentialist humanity, a clear demarcation between what is and 
what is not human. Posthuman critics such as Hayles, Donna Haraway, Mark Hansen, 
Bruno Latour, Michael Foucault have tracked how this humanism has permeated our 
social consciousness since Descartes’s “I think, therefore I am,” and demonstrated how 
humanity is not natural but a social construction. Posthumanism as an approach seems 
appropriate since it will be my contention that an unconscious social humanism 
functions as a litmus test to determine what we see as foreign to competition and what 
is simply a natural part of it. To inform my understanding of posthumanism (in order to 
critique the humanism I’m analyzing), I will rely on several texts, including Hayles’s How 
We Became Posthuman (1999), Haraway’s Modest Witness (1997) and Hansen’s 
Bodies in Code (2006). None of the texts address sports specifically, but I will apply 
their theories about embodiment and posthumanism in order to argue against 
humanism.  
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Core Research Questions: 
 
• How are technologies characterized in conversations about sports? What 
qualifies? What is overlooked? What does not? And what are the implications of 
these definitions on perceptions about PETs? What happens if we apply a 
posthuman analytical lens to PETs? 
 
• According to various discourse groups, which PETs are considered admissible 
and which are not? How do they come to these conclusions? And what do these 
shifting definitions about acceptability say regarding underlying assumptions 
about competition and the body? Essentially, why are some technologies that 
affect performance considered legitimate and others (like steroids) considered 
‘cheating?’  
 
• How do the arguments about PETs get negotiated, circulated, codified, and 
replicated? What underlying assumptions/perceptions are those arguments 
based on?  
 
Theoretical Framework & Chapter Breakdown 
 
In order to address the core questions, I will use a methodology developed by J. 
Blake Scott in Risky Rhetoric: AIDS and the Cultural Practices of HIV Testing. Scott’s 
work—an important text within the rhetoric of medicine—has nothing to do with 
performance enhancement or athletics, but the methodology he calls a rhetorical-
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cultural analysis enabled him to apply rhetorical criticism to the broader cultural network 
that makes up Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) testing technologies and practices. 
I plan to do the same thing with the network of PETs. Rhetorical analysis often 
examines specific texts within an individualized vacuum. With Scott’s approach, the 
tools of rhetorical analysis are used to analyze not texts by themselves, but instead the 
entire cultural circuit5 where arguments are created, circulated, transformed, and taken 
up by various cultural actors. When speaking about HIV home-testing policies, Scott 
claims that they are “shaped from complex relations among rhetorical, ideological, 
political, economic, institutional, and social forces” (5), and PETs function in much the 
same way. As the literature review showed, conversations about PETs occur in many 
forums and from many different authorities—medical labs to educational institutions to 
corporate entities to governing bodies to publishing outlets and to the steps of 
Congress, and from doctors to journalists to coaches to athletes and to the fans. But the 
voices themselves are only part of the story. The arguments about PETs are only made 
possible as a result of technological advancements and the products they generate. 
And the arguments are also shaped by extrarhetorical elements such as rules, physical 
bodies, statistics, results, training practices, and institutions. We are dealing with a 
material-semiotic network, and Scott’s rhetorical-cultural methodology is an ideal way to 
unpack the various cultural conditions by “account[ing] for the various actors and 
conditions that make production possible, mapp[ing] the transformations of forms and 
their intertexts, critiqu[ing] forms according to their effects, and interven[ing] to enable 
                                                        
5 “Cultural circuit” as articulated by Richard Johnson in his article “What is 
Cultural Studies Anyway?” 
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the development of better forms” (5) In this way, I also see correlations between the 
rhetorical-cultural approach and Foucault’s archaeological analysis. Foucault’s use of 
archive referred to the unwritten discursive rules that connected to the “system of 
enunciability […] that causes a multiplicity of statements to emerge as so many regular 
events, as so many things to be dealt with and manipulated (Foucault 1972, 129-120). 
As summarized by Markula and Pringle (2006), “Archaeological analysis is, accordingly, 
concerned with excavating the archive to reveal the interplay between discourses and 
the associated sets of rules that shape/constrain reality, and guide social practices” 
(31). Both a rhetorical-cultural methodology and an archaeological analysis focus on 
discourses and how they shape perceptions and actions, but they do so by expanding 
beyond the “too-simple claim that language constructs reality” (Scott, 34). With 
archaeological analysis, the acknowledgement that many of the discourse’s rules are 
“unwritten” and “emerge as so many regular events” will tie into my discussion of how 
black boxes form around major arguments about PETs.  
Although I will be using a rhetorical-cultural approach overall, a significant portion 
of my project will be aimed at theory building. I plan to create a new framework for 
talking and thinking about PETs drawing on Foucault’s “disciplinary power,” and Scott’s 
“disciplinary rhetorics.” According to Scott, “Disciplinary rhetorics are bodies of 
persuasion that work with extradiscursive cultural forces and actors to shape subject 
positions and the ways that they are materially inhabited. Disciplinary rhetorics have 
relational agency, defying rhetorical determinism and its too-simple claim that language 
constructs reality” (33). Essentially, disciplinary rhetorics are persuasive language that 
attempt to mold perceptions and conduct but always in conjunction with cultural forces. 
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We can see this happening with PETs in the various ways that technologies are 
embraced or rejected in sports, and how those decisions effect not only expectations 
and attitudes, but also the game play itself. Of course, an obvious location for this 
disciplinary rhetoric is in the abundance of sports commentary that surrounds each and 
every professional sporting event, but we can also see it in things like the rules and 
regulations for each sport. As Shogan claims, “rules of games prescribe certain actions, 
proscribe other actions, and describe boundaries or contexts within which these actions 
make sense” (4).  
Building off of disciplinary power and disciplinary rhetorics, I will construct a new 
framework for viewing sports, something I’m calling disciplinary mythologies. As a 
subset of disciplinary rhetorics, disciplinary mythologies are black boxed6 rhetorics of 
idealized notions that shape arguments and guide or regulate actions while obscuring 
the underlying complexities. They are the oversimplifications that develop from a 
layering of narratives and that then govern our perceptions and actions. Ghosts from 
that past that still influence current arguments. "Idealized" is a key term for me since I 
see many of the arguments about PETs stemming from idealized notions of what sports 
competition is or should be instead of what it really is. Also, I think it is important that 
disciplinary mythologies (at least the ones I am looking at) hide the complexities by 
replacing them with simpler, essentialist myths. When it comes to sports, many of the 
disciplinary mythologies stem from the humanist roots I will discuss in Ch. 2. Two 
specific examples I will develop are the nostalgia enthymeme and the level-playing-field 
                                                        
6 Bruno Latour’s discussion of black boxing in Science in Action figures heavily in my 
attempt at theory building.  
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topos. The former critiques sports’ desire to compare past benchmarks with current 
performance. Many arguments against certain PETs stem from this nostalgic desire 
(i.e., use of an asterisk for records set during the “steroid-era” in baseball), but any 
notion that we can accurately compare past performance with current performance is a 
myth that ignores sports’ fused existence with technology. The level-playing-field topos 
explores the myth that there is ever an actual level playing field and how that impacts 
arguments about PETs.  
 
Chapter 2: 
 
 Most of the “heavy lifting” for my project will come in chapters 2 and 3 
because this is where I will build the foundation and then the structure for my 
disciplinary mythologies theory. Relying heavily on posthumanism in Ch. 2, I will attempt 
to unravel the various shifting definitions/attitudes toward technology in sports. As 
Debra Shogan argues in The Making of High-Performance Athletes, sports are modern 
constructions in a postmodern world, and I will explore how modern thought still 
influences our perceptions of PETs. I will show how sports and technology are 
inextricably intertwined at all stages of competition. At the same time, I will argue that 
attitudes toward sports and technology are humanist in a posthuman world, and these 
humanist myths impact which technologies we consider acceptable and which we 
consider cheating in sports. Lastly, I will attempt to show how a more posthuman 
perspective on PETs could impact real-world competition. To accomplish this argument, 
I will layer three theories and show how they apply to sports culture. First, building off of 
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Mikhail Bahktin’s notion of a social language, I will show how the sports social language 
places technology, the body, and competition in an adversarial dynamic. Then I will 
incorporate Haraway’s use of fetish to situate the sport social language as a fetishism of 
sport, or in other words, a deliberate forgetting of the role technology plays in sports in 
favor of a “pure” or “natural” sport. Lastly, I will expand on Latour’s black box to discuss 
how technology gets subsumed into the large sport narrative (sport social language), 
essentially becoming invisible.  
 
Chapter 3: 
 
 In Chapter 3, I am going to build toward the disciplinary mythologies theory by 
exploring the two key precursor terms: disciplinary power and disciplinary rhetoric. With 
disciplinary power, I will examine how our understanding of high-performance athletics 
and technology is intricately tied to the different notions of discipline and discourse that 
Foucault develops in Discipline and Punish. Then to bridge the divide between 
disciplinary power and disciplinary rhetoric, I will incorporate Kenneth Burke’s notions of 
piety and terministic screens to show how the sport social language (developed in Ch. 
2) leads to a type of deep conviction that can become a disciplinary mythology. Next, I 
link disciplinary rhetorics to sports through a case study of Spira Shoes, examining how 
the arguments, rules, marketing, realities of competitive competition, and the 
implications of this specific technology are both formed by and inform perspectives 
about the roll technology is supposed to play in sports. This will lead to a brief 
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explanation of disciplinary mythologies and how they shift the focus onto the layering of 
narratives that create myths and shape beliefs.  
 
Chapter 4: 
 
 The fourth chapter will explore disciplinary mythologies in more depth by 
providing a case study for the arguments developed in Chapters 2-3. First, I will 
examine in detail the world of competitive swimming, focusing primarily on a two-year 
window where new swimsuits caused an uproar and led to claims of “technological 
doping.” The texts I analyze will come mostly from popular media since that is what 
shapes perceptions about PETs the most. I will then move from the broader theory to 
two discrete bodies of persuasion that I consider subsets of disciplinary mythologies—
the nostalgia enthymeme and the level-playing-field topos, both of which will continue to 
draw on the swimming case study. In this section, I will demonstrate how disciplinary 
mythologies have affected the acceptance of various PETs.  
 
Chapter 5: 
 
 The final chapter will draw upon all the threads developed in chapters 2-4—
sport social language, fetishism of sports, black boxes, disciplinary power, disciplinary 
rhetorics, disciplinary mythologies—ultimately attempting to merge them into a cohesive 
diagram for understanding sports discourse. Lastly, I will argue for a more 
encompassing perspective on PETs based on a posthuman perspective and offer a way 
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to move forward that will take into account how technology and sports are intricately and 
inextricably intertwined.  
 
Project Goals: 
 
1. Apply a Rhetorical-Cultural analytical lens to PETs. Several writers have applied 
a cultural analysis approach to PETs7, and it makes sense as a critical tool since 
sports are intertwined with culture in myriad complex entanglements that reflect 
on not only sports, but also culture itself. However, no one has offered a 
sustained rhetorical analysis of PETs, and since the intersection of sports and 
technology is often a contested space where arguments, opinions, perceptions, 
and ideals shape action, a Rhetorical approach is needed to unpack the complex 
threads that merge sports with culture.  
 
2. Argue for a posthuman understanding of technology/body in regards to PETs 
while shifting the emphasis away from steroids to take a more encompassing 
view of technology in sports. As Magdalinski argues, much of the controversy 
over PETs stems from an underlying fear of technoscience’s incursion into a 
realm that is viewed as “natural” and “authentic,” the human body and “spirit of 
the game” as something pure that technology corrupts. These fears drive many 
of the decisions that take place about what should and should not be allowed in 
sports. However, in the final chapter, I will show that by adopting a more 
                                                        
7 Shogan, Pronger, and Magdalinski all look at sports technologies using a Cultural 
Analysis lens in their various texts.  
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posthuman perspective, we can make judgments about which PETs should be 
acceptable based on desired outcomes rather than fear of technology.  
 
3. Develop a new theoretical framework (disciplinary mythologies) for examining 
PETs, one that helps to articulate the underlying assumptions and shifting 
definitions that take place when considering technology in sports. Debates about 
PETs are often one-sided, relying on simplified “mythologies” that render the 
complex relationship between sports, the body, and technology invisible. The 
disciplinary-mythologies framework will place a magnifying lens on these “black 
boxed rhetorics” and open them up for inspection and critical analysis.  
 23 
CHAPTER 2 
 
My goal for this chapter is to explore how a more posthuman approach to viewing 
people and our machines can affect our perceptions, discussions, and decisions about 
performance enhancement technologies in sports. In chapter 3, I will build on my 
arguments from this chapter about the sports social language and fetishism of sports to 
dissect the disciplinary rhetorics (stemming from our humanist episteme) that often 
determine popular arguments and actions toward PETs, eventually leading to a 
definition of “disciplinary mythologies” and why they are particularly suited for analyzing 
discussions about sports.  
However, in order to analyze perceptions, discussions, and decisions about 
sports, I must first address a definitional challenge. In sports discourse, debates (and, 
therefore, perceptions) about PETs erupt from murky, shifting definitions that often 
remain unarticulated and unexamined. For instance, let us begin with the central object 
of examination for this project: performance enhancement technologies in sports. On 
the surface, it is a phrase that many would characterize as straightforward. We all know 
what it refers to: technologies that enhance sporting performance. So we should easily 
be able to categorize what does and does not fit.  
Anabolic Steroids? Absolutely.  
Blood doping? Yes, that’s cheating. 
Hypoxic chambers? Sure, they are pretty technical.  
Tennis racquets? Golf Clubs? I guess if they are advanced enough. 
Running shoes? Well…? 
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Gatorade? Caffeine? Sunglasses? Diets? Ummmm… 
Much of the debate around PETs is an issue of defending the definitional borders, 
deciding what makes one technology acceptable and another taboo, but finding a clear 
definition is difficult. Since all definitions are tied to their uses, it might seem a simple 
task to draw the line at any use that provides an unfair performance enhancement; 
however, each sport must confront each new technology and determine what an 
acceptable use is within the context of that individual sport, but the arguments for or 
against a technology are rarely articulated in these terms. According to Tara 
Magdalinski in Sport, Technology and the Body (2009), “despite an ostensibly clear 
distinction between accepted technologies and those determined to be ‘performance 
enhancing,’ the line between the two is ever shifting and there is remarkably little 
consistency in determining which innovations acceptably assist the body and which are 
considered thoroughly inappropriate” (7).  
Part of the reason for these shifting boundaries is the difficulty in clearly defining 
the term performance enhancement technologies. Just a brief examination of the 
individual words in that phrase demonstrates the complexities that arise when delving 
into this topic. Take technologies, for example. How do we define it? We can all name a 
few dozen man-made objects that clearly fit into the technology category, but as we 
move further away from the realm of microchips, Bluetooth, carbon fiber, and batteries, 
what constitutes a technology becomes a bit trickier. In Readings in the Philosophy of 
Technology, David M. Kaplan explores this difficulty and comes to the conclusion that 
“there are so many different kinds of technologies, each designed for a different 
purpose, made from different materials, requiring different skills, and used in different 
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contexts that it is unlikely that a common set of defining properties could possibly apply 
to all of them.” There are simply too many variables. Most everyone would consider a 
stick natural, the primary antithesis to technology. However, when the stick is used by a 
blind person to navigate through the world, both providing crucial input and output to the 
user, it can be rightfully conceived as a technology. The stick, in the latter situation, is 
intimately intermingled with the user, creating what Hayles (1999) describes as a 
reflexive feedback loop. In other words, without the human, the stick is a stick; with the 
human, a complex relationship of mutual constitution emerges. And this is the case for 
all technology. According to Kaplan, scholarly consensus has long moved away from 
the theory of technological neutrality where technology is defined solely by its technical 
properties, existing in a valueless, purposeless vacuum outside of human society. 
Instead (and for good reason), the theory of social construction of technology 
dominates, where humanity and technology are not treated as separate entities on 
parallel tracks but rather as one symbiotic entity. In this way, technology should not be 
viewed by its technical properties but instead by how it is used to extend human 
capabilities. If a stick allows a person to better perceive and interact within his/her 
environment, then that stick is a technology within that context. In his explanation of the 
theory of social construction, we see Kaplan begin to express the complex, reflexive 
relationship between people and technology. He claims, “Humans make, use, and 
assign meaning to things in a variety of different ways, in relation to a variety of different 
social contexts. Far from being applied science, technology, on this model, is more like 
embodied humanity. Technologies are part human, part material, and always social” 
(2009, xviii). And although Kaplan does not express the reverse of this equation, a 
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cadre of posthumanist theorists—including Haraway, Hayles, and Hansen—have 
argued convincingly that humans are part technology, part material, and always social 
as well. As Hansen argues in Bodies in Code, “all reality is mixed reality” (5).  
 Defining technology (and humanity) in such a complex symbiosis works 
seamlessly with many topics, but it is problematic when discussing sports in general 
and PETs in particular. As I will demonstrate throughout this chapter, the sporting world, 
more so than many others, routinely is trying to separate humanity and technology, to 
determine where the one ends and the other begins. This is a direct result of articulating 
sports as a purely human endeavor, a way to measure our “natural” capabilities without 
technology muddying the results.  
 Another complicating factor when attempting to define technology is that popular 
perceptions about what constitutes technology tend to be ahistorical (we will see how 
this affects sports in Chapter 4). The term “technology” brings with it a connotation that 
is biased heavily toward the present. When asked to consider technology, the average 
person most likely will think of the latest gadget or innovation to hit the market. For 
instance, if asked to name a “technology for reading,” electronic devices such as the 
Kindle or iPad would be common answers, but few would mention the printed book. 
There is a shelf life for technology, and once an item loses its new, innovative luster, its 
role as technology becomes translucent and unremarked. Yet, the effects of 
technologies do not disappear along with their acceptance into that category. The 
printed book not only changed the way we communicate and record information, but it 
altered how humans think and perceive, the effects of which are still with us today (Ong, 
1982).  
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 Like technologies, we can follow similar rabbit holes when trying to define the 
other two key terms in the phrase Performance Enhancement Technologies. For 
instance, in his critical introduction to performative arts, Marvin Carlson claims that 
performance (much like technologies), “has so many nuanced meanings in various 
contexts that it’s a contested term that resists definitional closure” (Carlson, 2004). For 
our current purposes, there is no need for me to tease out the various definitional 
threads, but it is important to note that performance is an enacted experience that 
extends well beyond the bounds of the athletes or playing surface to encompass the 
spectators and circumstances as well. Much like what we said about technology, 
performance does not happen in a vacuum. We cannot separate the athlete’s bodily 
actions from the circumstances surrounding them. In other words, performance is not 
just in the doing; it is also in the viewing.  
This has several consequences when considering performance in the athletic 
realm. Drawing from the long history of performance in the creative arts, Magdalinski 
(2009) has a lengthy discussion of the nature of performance in modern athletics, and 
one of her conclusions is that “the audience determines the relative merit of the sporting 
performance that unfolds before them by comparing them to standard or invented 
measures (records), past athletic feats (by ‘the greats’) and ideal performances (a 
perfect ten). Their role is to establish success or failure” (62). The spectators are the 
legitimizing force behind the sport, which is why athletic accomplishments that are 
achieved without the audience’s tacit consent are roundly ignored and considered 
invalid. No one cares if Michael Phelps breaks a world record during practice or training; 
although he may have swum that particular distance faster than anyone else in the 
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world ever has, it is only acknowledged when he does so at a predetermined place and 
time designated by the audience. Magdalinski contends that athletic performances are 
co-created by audiences and performers, and therefore “the audience has a direct and 
essential stake in determining the authenticity of the performance, and, furthermore, 
‘purity’ of the event” (63).   
And finally, the term “enhancement” seems to raise more questions than it 
does answers. What qualifies as an enhancement? What enhancements are acceptable 
and why? How do we determine the effects of an individual enhancement without taking 
into account the entire sporting gestalt? The term “enhancement” implies a baseline 
measurement; otherwise, what are we enhancing from? There is a norming that must 
take place before we can intelligently discuss enhancing, but doing so for professional 
sports is problematic for several reasons. First, professional athletes are, by their very 
nature, far from normal. Not only do they possess natural abilities that break the mold, 
but also by the time they become professional, their natural skills have been so finely 
tuned and shaped (largely through technological means) that they have left normal (if 
there is such a thing) far behind. Additionally, all that training and shaping that takes 
place as they develop into high-level athletes creates comingled relationships with the 
technology used during that process. How can you separate the athlete from the 
technology that helped to create the athlete? Modern sports rely on technology; athletes 
rely on technology. If there is a norm, that is it. So to imply that there is some natural, 
baseline professional-athlete norm that we can then enhance beyond belies the fact that 
it took extensive technological enhancement just to get the athlete to that elite level.  
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Of course, we could continue to parse “performance” or “enhancement” or 
“technologies” into smaller and smaller pieces, trying to decode the definitional 
characteristics that unify each term, but analyzing the terms in such a way would reveal 
greater levels of contention rather than of unity. As Kaplan claims after attempting to 
define technologies, “Maybe we should heed the advice of Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
avoid the problem of definition altogether […] A concept can be useful and usable 
without being precisely determined […] It is more important to understand the role that a 
word plays in conversation than to search for the essence hidden behind a word’s 
meaning” (xv). Although Wittgenstein’s (and Kaplan’s) advice helps resolve the difficulty 
in attempting to define a complex, comingled phrase like Performance Enhancement 
Technologies, the “imprecisely defined” approach could be seen to be just as 
problematic. As we have seen, many of the debates about PETs involve making 
categorical decisions about what does and does not fit within definitional boundaries, 
but the basis for those arguments is not rooted in any clearly articulated definition. In 
other words, there is no consistent, definitive way to separate acceptable from 
unacceptable performance enhancement. Why does a shoe with a spring in the heel 
cause controversy (see discussion of Spira shoes in Ch. 3), but one with a spring-like 
foam heel gets ignored? Why are performance enhancement drugs (PEDs) banned and 
demonized, but supplements that attempt to achieve a similar effect widely accepted 
and encouraged? Why is carbon fiber allowed to revolutionize cycling equipment, but 
caffeine has been severely restricted8 at various times despite the fact that its impact 
                                                        
8 Before 2004, the International Olympic Committee has had strict restrictions on the 
amount of caffeine that could be found in a competitor’s blood, and if an athlete was 
found to exceed those amounts, (s)he could be eliminated from competition. Since 2004, 
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on the sport is far less significant than the former technology? Clearly, how we 
categorize various technologies and how we parse definitions have real-world 
implications. Attempting to apply a strict definition for PETs is impractical, especially 
considering the wide range of sports and sport governing bodies in existence. But 
without a precisely determined concept for PETs, the rules that are created to govern 
them can seem inconsistent, arbitrary, and/or biased.  
To try to address this problem, I plan to follow Kaplan’s final bit of advice—
understand the roles that the words play. For the most part, rules are not determined 
through strict definitions. Instead, rules are created to proscribe and prescribe certain 
actions and desirable outcomes. In other words, the question is whether these rules are 
communally accepted and what values is the sport attempting to promote when it 
creates rules and definitions.  
 
Sport Social Language 
 
 Another problem we need to contend with is that not all PETs are evaluated 
equally. Performance-enhancing technologies in general (i.e., anything that is meant to 
enhance human ability) and performance-enhancement technologies in sports are two 
different animals. “In sports” is a crucial modifier here as attitudes toward performance 
enhancement inside and outside of professional sports, and across different types of 
sports and competitions, differ widely. Take, for example, the preponderance of weight-
                                                        
those restrictions have been lifted (due in part to the difficulty with testing and 
enforcement), and the medical community has largely agreed that although an athlete 
will receive some benefit from caffeine, there is a leveling off to how much benefit 
an athlete can receive as (s)he consumes more of the substance.  
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loss products, sexual-improvement products, and memory-retention products. All of 
these could be considered PEDs, and yet they enjoy a high level of social acceptance. 
In a survey of both professional athletes and the general public in Norway about 
attitudes toward PETs (Breivik et al, 2009), over 60% of the general population 
responded that they would be willing to use a PED that improves memory, 35% would 
use one that improves sexual ability, and 48% would use one that improves general 
physical fitness. There were also high levels of acceptance for PEDs that would improve 
creative thinking, stress tolerance, physical strength, and emotional understanding. 
 I find the responses toward physical fitness and physical strength interesting as 
the same respondents reported almost universal disagreement with using Erythropoietin 
(EPO)9, anabolic steroids, or amphetamines in professional sports. So the general 
public has a high-level of willingness to use PEDs themselves to improve performance 
of one kind or another, even if those performance enhancers carry health risks with 
them, but they do not want to see athletes use similar substances within sports 
competitions.  
Clearly, there is a different set of criteria being applied to athletes and the rest of 
the population. Where PETs get scrutinized in one arena, they are embraced in another. 
How do we account for this? Let me turn first to Clay Spinuzzi’s Network: Theorizing 
Knowledge Work in Telecommunications. In the opening chapter, Spinuzzi has a 
                                                        
9 EPO is a glycoprotein hormone that controls the production of red blood cells. 
Endurance athletes have been known to inject EPO in order to increase the number of 
red blood cells in their body. More red blood cells means more oxygen circulating 
through the blood. Theoretically, more available oxygen leads to greater endurance. 
Similar results have been attempted by using hypobaric chambers (also known as 
altitude tents/chambers) or by simply training at high altitudes. Research shows that 
when your body is exposed to lower oxygen levels, it creates more red blood cells to 
carry the available oxygen.  
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detailed discussion of Bakhtin’s term “social language,” particularly how it is 
incorporated into activity theory. Essentially, a social language (the language of a 
particular group, often connected by knowledge, work, interest, belief, etc.) is not 
acquired; it is enacted. What is important for our specific purposes here is that a group’s 
attitude toward particular terminology (performance-enhancement technologies in this 
case) has little to do with its definitional boundaries. Attitudes are enacted and 
reinforced by the shared social language, and one group’s social language is not 
reproduced in another. Spinuzzi remarks that,  
some evolutionary biologists go to church; and as we’ve seen above, 
some pastors go to work for telecommunications companies. When these 
people talk about origins, when they discuss conversions, we have to 
understand that a change in social language can mean a change in logic, 
assumptions, ideology, standards of proof, rules, tools, and so forth (27).  
 
In the same way, someone within the social language of sports will view performance-
enhancement technologies in a very different light than someone outside of that, and 
statistical evidence from Breivik helps to support this claim. Even more interesting, 
groups surveyed indicate that they would have fewer objections to steroid use by 
amateurs rather than professionals. Survey participants report that they see less of a 
problem if amateurs use steroids for their recreational activities or to improve bodily 
aesthetics, but they claim that the amateurs should stop using steroids if they become 
“professionals” (Dawes, et al., 2004). Here we see that the social language changes 
when competition enters the equation, and specifically the issue raises the most 
concern in “professional” competition. Although “health risks” and “safety” are often 
used as arguments against the use of PEDs, those concerns appear to fade somewhat 
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when removed from the competitive environment. Instead, competition brings with it 
concerns about the level playing field, and more so than health concerns, issues of fair 
play appear to be the driving force within the sports social language. We can see the 
difference in logic, assumptions, rules, ideology, standards of proof, tools, and so forth 
that Spinuzzi discusses in his work.  
Before delving deeper into  the implications of the sport social language, it is 
important to clarify what sports and technologies this analysis mainly focuses on. First, 
the sports discourse I am reading and commenting on stems mostly from the United 
States. Although I suspect that similar arguments are made in other nation-specific 
sports conversations, I would not want to assume that is the case without further 
exploration.  
Additionally, even though I will refer to sports discourse and the sports social 
language as unified, monolithic entities, I am doing so for expediency and not because I 
am basing my claims off of an assumption that there is one single sports discourse or 
social language. Discourse is not as neat and tidy as that. I would not even argue that 
each sport has its own discourse. Both explicit and implicit arguments within any 
discourse relating to sports are shifting affairs that are negotiated and co-opted by 
various actors and conditions in order to accomplish differing purposes. Any detailed 
analysis of a specific argumentative thread should contextualize the rhetorics within 
their particular exigency. I have attempted to do in this project whenever I discuss a 
specific technology and sport. That being said, much of my own argument centers 
around a subtextual fetishism that I see as running underneath and informing sport 
discourses across many different sports and a variety of technologies. This is what I will 
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characterize as the sport social language, and as I will argue later in this chapter, this 
subtextual fetishism is often a ready-made entity that repeats and re-enforces certain 
claims and idealizations of sport.  
Of course, each sport will draw on this sport social language in different ways 
and to different extents. What fits the best within this framework are sports that have a 
long and rich history (e.g., baseball, basketball, golf, etc.) and sports where technology 
has a less obvious role during competition (e.g. swimming, running, boxing, etc.). Nearly 
all Olympic events would fit into this group as well as they tend to fit both these criteria. 
What could be seen as outliers are more recently created sports (e.g., esports) and 
sports where technology exerts its presence in a more overt way. Auto racing, such as 
NASCAR or F1, would be an example of the latter. It is impossible to ignore the 
presence of the technology in auto racing; however, even with something like NASCAR, 
there is still a hierarchical relationship that emphasizes the human over the machine. 
For this reason, arguments concerning auto racing could still draw on a similar 
subtextual fetishism of sport; it just might not be to the same extent or applied in the 
same way that we would see in arguments pertaining to track and field or wrestling.  
Also, the sport social language I will be identifying and describing here pertains 
more to the actual competition than the training before the competition. In fact, the sport 
social language hardly acknowledges training at all; it is almost an afterthought, or at 
least a footnote used to explain how an athlete was able to accomplish certain feats 
within a competition (i.e., “they hit as hard during practice as they do during the game, 
which has made them more prepared for the competition”). One thing I will attempt to 
show is how training gets black boxed within the sport social language.  
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Within the sports social language about competitions, judgments about issues 
like performance enhancement technologies are governed by often unarticulated and 
shifting boundaries. These boundaries come into existence and are (re)articulated and 
(re)enforced within the social language, and since they are enacted instead of static, 
they shift along with social forces and technological advancements. In The Practice of 
Everyday Life (1984), Michel de Certeau has a useful discussion on boundary formation 
as it relates to law. A judge’s opinion (interlocutory judgment) is an “operation of making 
out boundaries” (122). What de Certeau focuses on is the judge’s discourse and how 
the “narration is ‘established’ on the basis of ‘primary’ stories, stories that already have 
the function of spatial legislation since they determine rights and divide up lands by 
‘acts’ or discourses about actions” (122) If we take this approach and overlay it onto 
discussions about steroids (or other PETs) in sports, we see the “primary” stories as 
those from the dominant voices (i.e., popular media, Congress, sports commentators, 
sports administrators, medical professionals) and the “acts” as the regulations against 
steroids and rhetorics about the dangers of steroids10. So, within a social language, 
judgments, which form the basis of attitudes and boundaries, are formed by the 
dominant voices and the enacted experience.  
However, this is not a process of beginning; it is a process of continuation. As de 
Certeau claims, the judgments “operate within the aggregate of heterogeneous spaces 
that have already been created and established by the innumerable forms of oral 
narrativity […] preceding the judgment that regulates and settles, there is a founding 
                                                        
10 Within the rhetoric, “dangers” is only partially related to specific medical side 
effects. Just as often (if not more so), it has to do with ethical issues such as 
“fair competition” or the impact on youth.  
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narration” (126). In other words, judgments are the result of an always already-present 
layering of narratives. These layered narratives are what we can call the social 
language, and since they are always already present, when any new judgment has to 
be made, such as when a new technology emerges, it is never viewed through a 
completely new or unique lens. The weight of all the previous attitudes and boundaries 
shape the continuing narrative.  
Layering, as we see with the narratives in a social language, is an interesting 
phenomenon. Consider what happens when various sheets of translucent colored 
papers are layered on each other. What starts out as individual, vibrantly colored 
rectangles start to become muted as they stack on top of each other, eventually 
becoming a uniform black. The rough edges of contextualization get smoothed out layer 
by layer, and what we are left with is a cumulative norm. A social language is nothing if 
not a norming process—norming the narratives (and therefore the perceptions) of those 
using the social language. Hayles has a relevant discussion when she addresses the 
difference between the body, which is always a normative construction and 
embodiment, which relates to lived experience. Hayles argues that “To explore how the 
body is constructed within Renaissance medical discourse, for example, is to 
investigate the normative assumptions used to constitute a particular kind of social and 
discursive concept” (196). Although she does not use the term specifically, Renaissance 
medical discourse would be a clear example of a social language. So, Hayles is arguing 
that to investigate a social language is to unravel the normative assumptions that are 
used to compose perceptions and attitudes. Interestingly, a perfect example of this in 
the sport social language is in the representation of the elite athletic body, which is “an 
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idealized form that gestures toward a Platonic reality” (Magdalinski, 31).  In few other 
social languages is the body as reified as in the sports social language, and unlike 
much of the rest of culture, “where Botox, cosmetic surgery, prosthetic limbs and 
surgical interventions alter the shape, appearance, and function of bodies, it seems 
incongruous that there should be widespread concern about the technological 
modification of athletes.” Although numerous technologies are used to engineer and 
hone these bodies over years of training and development, the sport social language 
continues to imagine the athletic body as natural and authentic.  
Returning to de Certeau, he claims that “These ‘operations of marking out 
boundaries,’ consisting in narrative contracts and compilations of stories, are composed 
of fragments drawn from earlier stories fitted together in makeshift fashion. In this 
sense, they shed light on the formation of myths, since they also have the function of 
founding and articulating spaces” (122-23). I find de Certeau’s choice of “myths” useful 
to describe the makeshift boundary formation that takes place within a social 
language11. Numerous poststructuralists have discussed myths in culture, a notable 
example being Roland Barthes’s Mythologies. In a basic way, we can describe myths in 
this context as the narratives that remain unanalyzed yet (in)form our perceptions and 
boundaries. As we just saw, the athletic body is one such myth, and phrases like “a 
level playing field” and “integrity of the game” are artifacts of those myths. The myth of 
sports rises above the spectators, players, and regulators of sports, and although 
created by humans, idealized notions of sports and competition take on an objective 
                                                        
11 I will develop the idea of sports “mythology” more in Chapters 3-4.  
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humanist position that is outside subjective human perspectives.  
 
Humanism & Sports 
 
 Because of this sport social language, I cannot productively talk about PETs 
independently of sports. One example would be the attitudes toward a PET like a 
synthetic limb. Outside of a sporting environment (we cannot simply say “competitive 
environment” because there are many competitive situations—such as competing for a 
job—where PETs are not scrutinized as thoroughly) few people have an issue with 
someone using a prosthetic limb. Even within the sporting environment, few have a 
problem with prosthetic limbs as long as the person is competing against others with the 
same prosthetic limb (e.g., Special Olympics) or the limb is not considered a 
physiological factor in the competition (e.g., someone with a prosthetic arm wanting to 
compete in a track race). However, intense scrutiny is placed on someone with a 
prosthetic limb (e.g., a prosthetic running blade) who wants to compete against “able-
bodied” athletes in a competition that places significant physiological demands on that 
particular body part. Take South African double-amputee sprinter Oscar Pistorius, for 
example. With Pistorius’s success in the 2012 London Olympics and the murder 
indictment a year later, it is easy to forget that there was a lot of debate whether he 
should be allowed to compete in the 2011 World Championships despite having a fast 
enough sprinting time to qualify. In 2007, the International Association of Athletics 
Federations (IAAF) ruled that his two artificial limbs (dubbed running blades) gave him 
an “unfair advantage” because their springiness allowed him to push off the ground 
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more efficiently than does a normal human ankle, letting him coast along at higher 
speeds using less exertion than other sprinters. He was banned from able-bodied 
competition, and it was only after extensive legal battles throughout 2007 and 2008 that 
he eventually was allowed to compete in able-bodied competitions.  
The impact of the sport social language is not merely academic. As we see with 
Pistorius and a myriad of other examples, it has real-world consequences on sport, 
affecting everything from rules and equipment to media coverage and social 
implications. However, knowing that there is a social language that governs narratives 
about sports is different from knowing the tenor of that language. What is it within the 
sports social language that causes us to question (or accept) Pistorius’s legitimacy as a 
competitor? Why is it that some technologies are considered acceptable while others 
are not? My contention will be that the sport social language is decidedly humanist, and 
it is humanism’s hegemonic presence that steers the discourse about sports and 
technology.  
Before we examine how humanism directs the sports social language, it is 
important to establish a working understanding of how the term is being used here. 
Humanism is a term that is as elusive as it is all encompassing. From theorist to 
theorist, field to field, country to country, the various definitions, connotations, and 
implications of the term humanism will vary—sometimes slightly, often greatly. Yet, 
despite the transitory nature of this particular –ism, it is difficult to deny the stranglehold 
that humanism has had on Western culture for the last 500 years. Only in the twentieth 
century have we seen a concerted effort to challenge the main tenets of humanism, but 
despite the vocal outcries of many prominent theorists—from Marx and Freud to 
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Foucault and Lacan—humanism still thrives in a significant sector of the social 
unconscious (Badmington, 2000).  
 Reducing humanism to its least common denominators, we find three underlying 
premises: 
1. A rational human is central to an objective essence.  (“I think, therefore I am.”) 
2. The mind is separate from the body, and the body is separate from the 
surrounding environment. The mind is the seat of the Self, and the body is a 
tool of the Self that allows it to interact with the external world. Embedded in 
this is the notion of autonomy. Rational humans can act independently of the 
external world, making informed, un-coerced decisions.  
3. Along with autonomy is the component of human agency. Humans can control 
and shape their experiences and environment.  
 
Let me first address what may seem like a contradiction at first glance. As I have 
already argued, the sports world places primacy on the athletic body, but this is not in 
contradiction to humanism’s mind/body split or the hierarchy of the mind over the body. 
Instead, where many other social languages simply ignore the body, the sports social 
language (and really any social language that centers around physical activity) places a 
spotlight on it. This is not an upheaval of the dichotomy; instead, it recognizes both 
parts of the dichotomy while at the same time positing a notion of best body as one that 
is fit and disciplined, which is a sporting ideal. However, the mind is still in control, and 
in fact the psychology in sports and athletes is often part of the discourse (e.g., an 
athlete’s “mental toughness”) as a significant factor behind a win or loss. In some 
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sporting activities, the goal is to clear the mind. For example, in a golf swing, athletes 
are taught not to think about all the complexities of motion and body position while they 
are drawing back the club; they should just swing and rely on rote physical memory. In 
situations such as this, complex thought is seen as an impediment to physical 
execution. However, even when this is the case, wiping the mind of thought is viewed 
as a mental activity, a blankness that is enforced by a well-trained mind. The dichotomy 
remains, and although the body may get much more recognition in sports than it does in 
other fields, it still remains a tool of the mind.  
Moving on, the three above beliefs and their resulting implications of placing an 
individual person in a world that contains some sort of objective truth that could be 
rooted out through rational means have shaped Western ideology since Descartes 
spoke his immortal words. Humanism’s clearly defined hierarchy—
mind/body/environment—point toward an imagining of the world as a trichotomy rather 
than an ecology. Several consequences relevant to our current discussion flow from this 
top-down structure. First, the body is designated as the primary ontological access point 
to the world (Hansen 5). The mind is the seat of the Self, but it is the body and its 
sensory capabilities that provide the raw data to determine reality. Although we could 
argue that it is impossible to know anything without the body playing a role in sensing, 
the boundaries drawn by humanism’s central tenets make it difficult to imagine a 
codetermining relationship between the body and other technical apparatus. As a result, 
the body remains distinct (and generally superior) to the technology it uses. Additionally, 
humanism places the human epidermis as the distinct boundary between the body and 
the world.  
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One consequence of the humanism inherent in the sport social language is that 
the autonomous athletic body (when they are perceived as being “pure”) and technology 
are often placed in antagonistic or hierarchical relationships (sports, typically in the form 
of individual athletic body, in a privileged position over technology). A recent Gatorade 
campaign and slogan, “Win from Within,” are good examples of this tension. The text of 
one such commercial reads,  
Your moisture wicking fabric isn’t enough. Your zero-weight shoes aren’t 
enough. Your carbon-fiber racquet isn’t enough […] Nothing you put on is. 
It’s up to you (long pause); You, and what’s inside you. What you put into 
it is what you get out of it. Simple as that. You explode into the record 
books. You show no mercy. You come back strong. You win from within.  
 
The Gatorade commercial highlights the humanism within the sports social 
language. There is clearly a split between the athlete and the technology, the one being 
subsumed by the other. Although the shoes are on the feet, the racquet is in the hand—
and it would be impossible to compete in the sport without these technologies—it is 
clear that the equipment is secondary to the user. Here the human epidermis separates 
You from everything else. “You win from within.” Obviously, there are two distinct 
meanings when the ad discusses “what’s inside you.” On the one hand, it points toward 
the an inner spirit, a determination that is emphasized in the sport social language, but 
on the other hand, it clearly suggests that Gatorade becomes part of You once it enters 
your mouth. The implication being that Gatorade is also a primary factor in athletic 
success. Gatorade (or other “replacement” drinks) is one technology that is able to 
breach the humanistic boundary between the outside and inside worlds without causing 
alarm.  
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Although modern performance enhancement technologies and professional 
sports are intertwined in a recursive loop, as we shall see, the sport social language 
writes the narrative to disguise the role of technology in sports by “naturalizing” sports 
and relegating anything “artificial” to a minor (often overlooked or ignored) or contested 
position.   
 
Fetishes & Black Boxes 
 
Several important theories have been developed that can help us unpack the 
type of naturalizing that takes place when the sports social language distorts the 
relationship between modern sporting competition and technology. The first that I’ll draw 
on is Haraway’s notion of “fetishism.” In 
Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium.FemaleMan_Meets_OncoMouse: Feminism and 
Technoscience, Haraway discusses the fetishism of science, which she terms as “the 
culture of no culture, the language of no language, the trope of no trope, the one self-
referential world” (138). Essentially, Haraway argues that science has bought into the 
myth of its own pure objectivity, and it propagates this myth as a way to bolster its own 
singular role as diviner of truth. Within the social language of science, the “forgetting” 
takes place between technoscience and culture/humanity. We create science only to 
forget our role in creating it. Science (from the viewpoint of the fetishists) is not made; it 
is discovered. Haraway calls these fetishes a “god trick” and claims they are where 
complex, codependent relationships between actors and actants become transparent, 
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mistakenly shading things as clear and under control. She says they “shape what 
millions of people consider common sense in thinking about human nature” (218).  
We see a similar fetishism of sports taking place in the American consciousness, 
especially in conversations about PETs. Just as science and culture are irrevocably 
intertwined, so too are modern sports and technology. Yet, in both cases, the fetishism 
attempts to obscure the complex relationships by supplanting one term (culture in the 
first and technology in the second) with a nontropic, value-free manifestation of nature. 
Science seeks to discover purely what is true and natural while sports showcase natural 
human athletic ability. The essence of sports is distinctly separate from technology—or 
so the fetishes claim.  
In sports commentary, fetishism of sports abounds. For example, in a column for 
Sports Illustrated magazine, famed sports writer Frank Deford laments how 
performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs) irrevocably taint the purity of sports by making us 
question the bodies we’re watching. He argues,  
 
Athletics, like the other performing arts, is primarily a function of the body. 
[…] At base, we attend games and we become sports fans because we 
are enthralled that these young men and women are capable, with their 
bodies, of what we could never manage with ours. We envy and cheer 
their graceful superiority.  
When athletes take performance-enhancing drugs they destroy that 
basic truth. Imagine if there were a drug that could improve a tenor's or a 
soprano's voice, so the notes were purer -- that would devalue all opera 
because the art would be false, the cognoscenti unable to trust what they 
would be hearing as true human beauty […] in sports, the bodies must be 
honest, or what's the point?  
[PEDs] don't just poison the game, they poison our faith. It's only 
natural now that every rational person must at least wonder whenever any 
athlete, no matter how revered, does something exceptional. We've been 
surprised too often, disillusioned too often, suckered too often, hurt too 
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often. So eventually, we might doubt all the bodies. And if you doubt the 
voices, there is no opera; if you doubt the bodies, there is no sport. It 
becomes just another entertainment with special affects. 
 
Deford’s comments, published not long after Lance Armstrong publically admitted 
to using PEDs, echo the cacophony of voices that have spoken out vehemently 
against the use of PEDs in sports. Here Deford’s use of “bodies” is a substitution 
for a nontropic nature. When he discusses the honest body, it is clearly glossing 
over all the modern technologies that went into crafting that athlete. Instead, we 
have the conflation of modern athlete and Greek myth—athlete emerging fully 
formed, basketball in hand, with nothing more than determination and 
commitment governing the heights to which he can reach. PEDs poison Deford’s 
faith because they call into question the naturalness of the myth he has created. 
His comments about opera prove the point. Take, for example, his argument that 
“true human beauty” is devalued if technology (in the form of some sort of PED) 
enters into the operatic performance. What Deford forgets is the bevy of audio 
equipment, structural acoustics, voice-strengthening techniques, medical 
equipment for healing and strengthening vocal cords, and a number of other 
technologies that all fuse into what the audience hears as a note. The forgetting 
we see here is the same kind of fetishism that takes place in sports when 
technology becomes transparent and only the pure, natural athlete remains. 
However, in Deford’s myth, only the known technologies can be dismissed into 
transparency. It is the wondering that is dangerous, that makes us feel 
disillusioned and suckered. Is he using a PED or isn’t he? We can see an athlete 
drink the Gatorade, put on the compression fabric, compete with specialized 
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equipment, or train using scientific techniques, but PEDs shake our faith because 
there is the air of unknown, of back-alley injections that create a Superman 
hidden under the skin away from critical view. Where the former technologies fade 
into transparency, the latter exert themselves due in no small part to the mythos 
surrounding them. Deford’s final statement that PEDs transform sports into “just 
another entertainment with special effects” echoes the sentiment of many sports 
writers and enthusiasts that with some PETs the technology will supplant the 
athlete. Here we see another fetish at work, but this time it is a fetishism of 
technology. Once again, the fetish masks the fact that sports and technology are 
in a complex heterogeneous relationship and instead removes the body from the 
equation; the athlete becomes transparent and the technology is seen as the 
primary element competing in the game.  
Whether we are talking about fetishism of the natural body or fetishism of 
technology, Haraway would label either as “corporeal fetishism,” which she 
describes as “mistaking heterogeneous relationality for a fixed, seemingly 
objective thing.” Such grossly oversimplified relationships deny “the ongoing 
action and work that it takes to sustain material-semiotic bodies in the world” 
(142).  And there are real-world consequences to such corporeal fetishisms. They 
shape ideas about what an organism is and what its boundaries are, and as we 
have already seen, much of the debate over PETs exists in the shifting haze of 
unarticulated definitions and boundaries surrounding them.  
In Science in Action, Latour develops a concept similar to Haraway’s 
fetishes, but whereas the fetishist generally is unaware of the troping taking place, 
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a person “black boxing” makes a conscious choice (at least in the beginning) to 
ignore complexity and focus just on effect. As Latour explains,  
 
The word black box is used by cyberneticians whenever a piece of 
machinery or a set of commands is too complex. In its place they draw a 
little box about which they need to know nothing but its input and output 
[…] That is, no matter how controversial their history, how complex their 
inner workings, how large the commercial or academic networks that hold 
them in place, only their input and output count (3).  
 
However, Latour’s use of black box quickly evolves throughout Science in Action 
to encompass any claim, debate, belief, knowledge, etc. that has been settled (at 
least in the mind of the user) and become solidified. As subsequent voices take 
up these black boxes over time, their origins get obscured and they become 
routine choices, accepted without thought or question. It is what Latour calls a 
move from “science in the making” to “ready made science.” As the black box 
gains momentum and force, it becomes increasingly difficult not only to challenge 
it12, but, in some cases, to even recognize its existence. At this point it can look 
very similar to Haraway’s fetishes—transparent, depicting simplicity where there 
is complexity.  
 Latour developed his unblackboxing approach to analyze how science is 
created, but others have adopted the technique to discuss a variety of social and 
cultural points of contention13. Although analyzing how PETs originally became 
                                                        
12 Most of Science in Action is devoted to establishing the complex systems that lead 
to black boxes in science. In order to challenge a black box, you must challenge all 
those who have taken up the box, and to do that often requires an extensive network or 
resources and allies.  
13 Specifically, Scott uses this approach in Risky Rhetoric to discuss 
arguments/issues surrounding at-home HIV testing. I’ll discuss Scott more in the next 
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black boxed is beyond the scope of this project, I find the image of a black box 
with its input and output a useful way to visualize the process that takes place 
when technologies get absorbed into or rejected from the black box of acceptable 
PETs.  
 If we take a specific event, say a tennis match, and consider it to be a 
snapshot of athletic competition, the fetishism of sports presents this match as a 
unified image, encapsulated in time (from the first serve to the last point), where 
one competitor faces off against another to determine the better player. It is an 
image that gets labeled as “pure competition,” bringing with it all the classic 
connotations that purity conveys—natural, essential, untainted truth. Within this 
particular social language, only equivocal ideals such as skill, athleticism, 
determination, strategy, execution and effort are accepted as contributing factors. 
All of these emphasize the athlete as the sole actor, intricately entwining purity 
with humanity.  
 However, as you zoom closer into the snapshot, you are forced to 
acknowledge that the once unified image is actually a gestalt. Competition is a 
messy, dynamic affair, and at any given moment, a mass of co-dependent, 
entangled forces are at work. It is what an actor-network theorist may call a node 
where human and nonhuman actants fuse together and resist easy separation or 
simplification. In addition to the previously stated equivocal ideals, every 
competition is constituted by a multitude of other forces, many of which are 
                                                        
chapter.   
 49 
external to the athlete and the encapsulated event. Obvious forces at work would 
include coaching, environment, game plan, field-of-play conditions, and crowd 
participation (the home-field advantage). And the forces extend beyond the 
match’s start and finish to include such factors as training and preparation, an 
athlete’s life and lifestyle, travel conditions, cultural, etc. Of course, an athlete’s 
psychological state-of-mind and physiological condition are obvious factors, but I 
have argued elsewhere that the rhetoric inherent in all the media coverage 
surrounding professional athletes, especially when there is controversy or 
scandal, can have a significant impact during competition (Lamothe, 2012). And 
let us not forget about the technologies at play as well, not only those used during 
the match, but also those used to prepare the athlete before the competition.  
When considering the snapshot of a tennis match mentioned earlier, it is 
impossible to differentiate what forces are at work at any given instant. Did the 
athlete score an ace on her serve because of better skill? Or because of a 
strategic game plan (her opponent plays too deep)? Or because a slight divot in 
the court made the ball spin off at a sharp angle? Or because she had the wind at 
her back and the crowd cheering her on? Or because the new composite strings 
of her racquet generate 2 percent more power than her previous strings? Or 
because her opponent had a subtle glare from the sun in her eyes? Or because 
her opponent’s shoes slipped a fraction of an inch when she lunged for the ball 
because they had a circular traction pattern instead of ridged pattern? Or because 
her opponent’s reaction time was slightly decreased due to an argument with her 
spouse leading to a restless night’s sleep? Or was it all of these things at once?  
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The complexity of a sporting competition is irreducible in any kind of 
determinant way; however, that is exactly what the sports social language 
attempts to do—reify a vast jumble of forces into a unified and dissectible thing. 
Although this process may make discussing the sporting event more manageable, 
the consequence is a forgetting or ignoring of many of the forces at work. Latour 
discusses this process when analyzing laboratories. As a scientist studies an as-
of-yet unidentified phenomenon, the ‘thing’ is defined by its performances. For 
instance, Latour gives the example of a microbe, which before it was named as 
such, was known by its actions of transforming sugar into alcohol in Pasteur’s lab. 
The thing is exposed to various environments, and its performances are noted—it 
breaks down sugar in the absence of air but stops when air is introduced. This 
“science in the making” does not last long as each performance presupposes a 
competence, which retrospectively explains the actions. According to Latour, “The 
[thing] is no longer a score list of actions; he, she or it is an essence slowly 
unveiled through each of his, her or its manifestations” (89).  
We can draw a parallel here between science in the making and sport in 
the making. As the event is occurring, it is defined by the performances: a swing 
of the racquet here, a sliding forehand there. But very quickly those actions are 
co-opted into the overarching narrative, a narrative that remains constrained by 
the sports social language. It is no longer a sliding forehand but instead a 
momentum-changing point; no longer a swing of the racquet but instead a finely 
tuned strategy to attack the opponent’s weak backhand. In other words, the 
competition becomes ready made sport. Latour argues that 
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As long as anaerobic microbes are shaped by the list of trials I 
summarized above, it is easy to relate to them: tell me what you go 
through and I will tell you what you are. This situation, however, does not 
last. New objects become things: ‘anaerobic microbes,’ things isolated 
from the laboratory conditions that shaped them, things with a name that 
now seem independent from the trials in which they proved their mettle. 
(91) 
 
This process, what Latour refers to as routinisation, is very common. It occurs in 
everything from simple tasks like using a can opener to more complex operations 
like driving a car. We consider the car and the skill to handle it as a black box, 
“which means that it is unproblematic and does not require planning and 
attention” (92). We forget about all the challenges we encountered when learning 
how to drive, forget about the complex interaction that takes place between the 
thousands of mechanical/chemical operations at any given moment and the 
human interface. We just drive14.  
 Although black boxing is quite common, and perhaps even necessary for 
humans to process all the complex relationships we encounter daily, it does have 
consequences on how we perceive those nodes of interaction. As discussed 
earlier, sport competitions are a fusion of intricate forces acting in constantly 
varying and unknowable proportions at any given moment, and those forces 
extend well beyond the confines of the event itself to include what an athlete has 
done leading up to the competition as well as larger personal and social 
influences. However, as the sport in action transitions into the ready made sport 
(through the black boxing process), the newly created thing becomes increasingly 
                                                        
14 We just drive until we are confronted with an obstacle or situation that forces 
open the black box. I will discuss what happens in these situations in more detail in 
Chapter 4.  
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isolated and independent from the forces that forged it. If we diagram this 
transition, we would start with the forces acting on the individual athlete (Fig 1).  
 
 
 
 
Here we see the athlete with various forces drawn as vectors, meaning they have 
magnitude and direction. As the forces interact with each other, they shape the 
athlete. This is a process that extends well beyond the confines of any specific 
competition, and each of them has a litany of techniques and technologies at their 
core.  
 
Diet/Nutrition 
Strategy/Preparation 
Psychological 
condition/Social 
factors 
Athlete 
Figure 1: Diagram of the various forces at work on an athlete before and after a 
competition.  
Equipment 
Physiological 
condition/health 
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When athletes meet in competition, the forces acting on each person 
merge with environmental forces (i.e., playing conditions) and must also respond 
to the forces of the other athlete (Fig. 2). For example, the weak ankle from a 
previous injury, perhaps having limited force on the athlete as (s)he enters the 
competition, may gain magnitude as it interacts with rainy court conditions and/or 
an opponent who forces the player to change direction quickly and often. The 
extra hours the other athlete spent reviewing tape of the opponent’s previous 
matches gains magnitude as (s)he is able to more quickly respond to the 
Playing Conditions 
Spectators 
Officiating 
Broadcasting demands 
Figure 2: Diagram of forces acting on the competitors during the athletic 
competition 
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opponent’s tendencies. At this point, we are still dealing with sport in the making. 
Action and reaction; interacting forces with their varying magnitudes and direction. 
This is a dynamic node with layers upon layers of complex interactions.  
However, as spectators (including commentators, sports reporters, fans, 
etc.) attempt to interpret what is happening, moving it from sport in the making to 
ready made sport, a black box forms to help simplify the complex interactions (Fig 
3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As a result of this routinisation, many of the forces at work fade into the 
background and become transparent, especially those forces that extend beyond 
the confines of the actual competition (i.e. training, conditioning, diet/health, social 
Competition 
Black Box Athletes Results 
Figure 3: Diagram of an athletic competition being black boxed.  
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factors, etc.), and only those forces with a particularly evident magnitude remain 
apparent. These are times when one force or another is so apparent it emerges 
as part of the story, escaping from the black box to become part of the output 
narrative. Pistorius’s running blades (or any non-normalized body) would be an 
obvious example of an evident magnitude as they are difficult to ignore since they 
disrupt the normalized body so dramatically. A more common example would be 
when an athlete has a dominating performance, such as when a hockey goalie 
has a 50-shot shutout or when a football defensive back has a four-interception 
game. In those situations, aspects of the competition become part of the output 
narrative (i.e., the Bruins won because of Tukka Rask’s all-star performance) and 
the sport social language marks the results as exceptional but pure. Conversely, 
when windy, wet conditions, for example, affect a quarterback’s accuracy or when 
a referee makes a controversial call that is seen to affect the final score, the force 
is never perceived as synchronous with the dominant sport social language. To 
put it differently, the referee’s bad call is not seen as just another contributing 
factor toward “pure” competition. It disrupts the purity.  
With any black box, the only thing that remains is the input and output, but 
even these two components are simplified and representational. The athlete 
comes to embody all the forces acting upon him/her, creating a unified image 
from one that is greatly fractured, and in a similar way, the results come to 
represent the action during the competition.  
There is a reason scientists use black boxes, and the same goes for sports 
spectators: it is useful shorthand. By hiding the intricate complexities that would 
 56 
bog down understanding and instead focusing on a few key simplicities, we 
facilitate mutual conversation and, eventually, mutual meaning…that is as long as 
the input and output are clearly understood and agreed upon. In the case of 
technology in sports, the black box is not simply reductional (condensing 
complexity into simplicity); it is transformative. Technology enters the black box as 
a part of the athlete, the sport, and the competition, but once inside, technology is 
rendered inert, a non factor, and what exits the box is the perception of “pure 
human competition” (Fig. 4).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, as we have seen in the contested space that is “technology in 
sports,” what enters and exits the black box is not always clear and is often 
 
 
Competition 
Black Box 
Technolog
y 
Figure 4: Diagram of how the black box simplifies the complex forces at work.  
“Pure” Competition 
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contentious. As I have argued earlier in this chapter, technology is intricately 
intertwined with the athlete on the micro level and sports on the macro level. They 
are inseparable. And yet some technologies are allowed to enter the black box as 
a subsumed part of the input, thus rendered less visible (or even invisible), and 
others are not. Take, for example, compression materials in clothing, which 
testing has demonstrated have a positive impact on performance because, 
among other reasons, they decrease lactic acid buildup and reduce muscle 
oscillation, both of which contribute to fatigue. The benefits are so prized that 
most athletes in nearly every professional sport incorporate some kind of 
compression garment into a base layer or even into the actual uniform. Here is a 
clear example where technology merges with and affects athletic performance, 
and yet this is a technology that has faced little to no resistance. Even early in its 
development, no significant voice claimed that compression materials provide an 
unfair advantage or are unnatural. Yet, other technologies, especially those 
classified as PEDs, are rejected before they ever enter the black box.  
 In the Breivik survey about attitudes toward performance-enhancing 
substances and body modification techniques, both Norwegian professional 
athletes and general public reported almost unanimous acceptance of vitamins, 
minerals, and supplements for use by professional competitors, but they reported 
almost unanimous rejection of anabolic steroids, EPO, and amphetamines (2009). 
On the surface, these results are not that surprising, but when you take into 
account the fact that many supplements are used to create performance effects 
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similar to those gained from using the banned substances15, the difference in 
how they are viewed and accepted is revealing. The banned substances never 
make it into the black box, but supplements, which are just as much of a 
technology as any banned substance, glide in without resistance and become 
transparent along with all the other technologies used to shape the athlete and 
competition (Fig. 5).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
15 For instance, creatine is a common supplement used to gain strength and lean muscle 
mass, similar to what can be gained from anabolic steroids, and nitrite (in the form 
of OTC supplements like NO2 or prescription Viagra) helps to increase blood flow and 
oxygen delivery, which is what EPO is used for. I realize that some would balk at the 
comparison since there are differences in potential risks with these various 
substances, but risk factors aside (and all of these can have serious negative side 
effects when misused) the intended performance gains from taking them are similar.  
Competition 
Black Box Technologies 
“Pure” 
Competition 
Figure 5: Diagram of technologies being rejected from entering the black box.  
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Clearly, something is occurring before the technologies enter the black 
box, but what? Why do some technologies get routinized and others get 
demonized? One answer resides in the transition from sport in the making to 
ready made sport through a process of creating narratives.  The list of actions, 
statistics, and data that make up sport in action get contextualized as they are 
reflected upon, which means that the black box does not form in a vacuum; it is 
not asocial. And since nearly all talk (i.e., narratives) draw from the same sport 
social language, the black box exists in a cloud of the dominant sport discourse 
(Fig. 6).  
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As we have seen, the sport social language is decidedly humanist. It is infused 
with notions of what is natural and pure, and these work as filters for both what 
enters and exits the black box. Decisions about what technologies should and 
Competition 
Black Box Technologies 
“Pure” 
Competition 
Figure 6: The sport social language is the substrate in which the PETs black 
box exists. 
 
Unfair 
Unnatural 
Sport Social Language 
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should not be acceptable in sport competition are not determined strictly by their 
effect on the athlete or performance. Technologies that are perceived as 
unnatural or unfair get rejected before they enter, even if they are no more 
unnatural or unfair than a similar technology that is considered acceptable. 
Everything else makes it in, and what leaves the box (now in the form of ready 
made sport) is considered pure competition.  
 In the case of anabolic steroids, EPO, or other PEDs, the dominant social 
language deems them both unnatural and unfair, so they get rejected quickly. 
However, supplements carry the aura of “natural” with them. Even the term 
“supplement” implies that it is subordinate to what is natural or essential within the 
athlete. It adds to the athlete, but not in a primary way. The category of 
supplements carries this connotation in part because of great marketing, but also 
because many supplements are derived from naturally occurring substances. 
Creatine, for instance, is a nitrogenous organic acid that occurs naturally in 
vertebrates, so athletes can increase their creatine levels by eating more animal 
meat. However, the concentrated, refined version of creatine that is sold as a 
supplement and is far more potent than its naturally occurring cousin is anything 
but natural. An athlete could not eat enough meat to get the same levels of 
creatine that (s)he gains from the supplement. Claiming that the supplement 
version of creatine is natural because I can get creatine naturally by consuming 
certain foods is like saying that a tanning bed is natural because I could get the 
same effect and Vitamin D by laying on the beach.  
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 The process of determining what counts as unfair or unnatural can 
sometimes take a while and is not always predictable. For example, the Breivik 
survey showed a favorable response to hypoxic rooms, with 65.4% of athletes 
feeling they are acceptable and an even higher percentage among the general 
population (2009). Essentially, a hypoxic room or tent replicates high-altitude 
conditions with lower oxygen levels. When an athlete trains at high altitudes, it 
forces the body to create more red blood cells in order to carry more oxygen 
through the blood stream. The ability for the body to circulate more oxygen has 
obvious advantages for endurance-related competitions. In fact, that is the goal of 
using the banned substance EPO. The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) 
considered adding hypoxic rooms to the list of banned substances in 2007, but at 
this point it has not, and a majority of those surveyed in Breivik did not see a 
problem with the technology. Hypoxic rooms slip past the unnatural and unfair 
filters. However, although similar results can be achieved by training in high 
altitudes, that does not make a hypoxic room any less technical or more natural. 
Artificially lowering the oxygen levels is still very artificial even if those levels exist 
somewhere else on the planet. One of the popular arguments against PETs is 
that they offer a short cut to lazy athletes who want to get the same results as 
their more dedicated competitors. Why spend hours in the gym when I can simply 
pop a pill and get the same results? It is a popular position and one that helps to 
mark some technologies as unfair or unnatural. However, what is a hypoxic room 
other than a technology that offers a short cut? Why go through the time, 
expense, or hassle of traveling to the mountains and training when I can simply 
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jump on a stationary bike in a hypoxic room? It also cannot be viewed as fair 
since not all competitors have equal access to the technology.  
 As we can see, the impact of the sport social language on how we perceive 
and determine what is and is not an acceptable technology within sport is as 
important, if not more so, than the actual impact that the technology has on the 
athlete or competition. At the same time, the sport social language works to hide 
the role of technology in sport, making it transparent through a black boxing 
process that generates a false narrative, one that replaces the real character of 
professional sports with one that depicts it using humanist ideals of “pure sport,” 
“natural,” and “level.”   
 
Posthumanism 
 
  In The Making of High-Performance Athletes, Shogan’s underlying 
argument can be summed up with, “the making of high-performance athletes is 
still quintessentially a modern project despite the fact that high-performance sport 
competitions now occur in a post-modern context or condition” (9). Although 
Shogan is speaking specifically about power structures and discipline (therefore 
embedding the conversation in a modern/postmodern discourse), a parallel 
argument could be made that the making of high-performance athletes is a 
humanist project despite the fact that it occurs in a posthumanist context. Shogan 
hints at such a claim when she quotes Foucault, “over the whole surface of 
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contact between the body and the object it handles, power is introduced, 
fastening them one to another” (29).  
  We have seen how the sport social language is governed by humanism 
and a fetishism of the body, but I will argue that posthumanism offers a potential 
alternative. 
As indicated by its prefix, Posthumanism suggests a succession to or leaving 
behind of Humanism, but at the same time, as Foucualt and others point out, the very 
postness of the term irreparably constrains the posthuman with the language of 
Humanism. We cannot speak of the posthuman without creating a binary between 
human and its post. Therefore, even though the idea of “-post” implies an open ended 
horizon for which the posthuman can expand into, the term itself—at least in its current 
theoretical state—generally stands as a resistance to the two main tenets of Humanism 
and not as something separate, distinct, and new. If we were to ask the question, “What 
is the posthuman?,” the answer would most likely run parallel to “That which offers a 
deliberately contrary perspective to that of Humanism.” As a result, theorists such as 
Foucault and Donna Haraway address the posthuman in order to challenge the 
essentialist view of humanity, and theorists such as Katherine Hayles and Jean 
Baudrillard use Posthumanism to problematize the mind/body split and the 
subordination of the body to the mind.  
However, as Badmington states in the Introduction to his collected work titled 
Posthumanism:  
If, the anti-humanists argued, ‘we’ accept humanism’s claim that ‘we’ are 
naturally inclined to think, organize and act in certain ways, it is difficult to 
believe that human society and behavior could ever be other than they are 
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now. Humanism was therefore to be opposed if radical change, the 
thinking of difference, was to become a possibility (7). 
 
In addition to fixing humans with an essence, which restricts the ability to change, 
modern thinkers also recognized the various influences that humanism did not account 
for—i.e. society/culture’s impact in shaping humans; the unconscious, prenoetic, and 
irrational influences on the self; the role of subject positions that challenge any 
objectivity, etc. Posthumanism seeks to rectify this oversight.  
A significant result of this essentialist view in regard to sports is the naturalizing 
of sport competition. This is a prime example of where the sport social language, 
fetishism of sport, and the black boxing of PETs join with an essentialist Humanism to 
shape the narrative about athletic competition and technology.  It begins with the notion 
that the human16 is natural and technology is artificial. The dichotomy sets up a clear 
division between human and technology, and in the humanist episteme, it privileges 
human over technology. As Magdalinski claims, “It is clear that within sport, there is an 
assumption that the body is natural, and the apprehension that performance enhancing 
technologies provoke derives from a primary fear of contaminating its purity” (10). I 
would argue that what Magdalinski is really talking about is the sport social language. 
Sport itself does not assume anything about nature and technology; how we talk about 
sport does. And when speaking about the natural in sport, the fetishism of sport takes 
over. The complex technological interventions used to create the elite athlete are 
forgotten, and a narrative that stresses purity remains. The history of sport is rife with 
examples how the naturalizing of competition, and Magdalinski provides a useful 
                                                        
16 Of course, arguing that a professional athlete is a natural creature is a deeply 
flawed argument. 
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overview of its development from the spirit of sport in nineteenth-century constructions 
of Muscular Christianity and amateurism. The end result is that anxieties toward 
technology in sport are “provoked by a ‘technophobia’ that values ‘natural’ products 
more than human-made or artificial exemplars (Barilan and Weintraub 2001), and are 
reinforced by the mythology of sport as a purely natural enterprise” (15).  
Introducing a posthuman perspective could challenge the nature/technology 
dichotomy so entrenched in the sport social language. If instead of seeing man and 
technology as separate we recognize their co-evolutionary trajectory, we challenge the 
fetishism of sport that hides technology in favor of purity. Hayles argues that one 
defining characteristic of posthumanism is that “the posthuman view thinks of the body 
as the original prosthesis we all learn to manipulate, so that extending or replacing the 
body with other prostheses becomes a continuation of a process that began before we 
were born” (3). Without using the term posthumanism, Magdalinski echoes this 
sentiment when she says, “Rather than fixed, the body is flexible, the boundaries of the 
‘natural’ stretching as easily as the skin that encases the corpus” (10). Whereas 
humanism subordinates technology to the body, Hayles claims, “obviously, if the body 
and technology are involved in a coevolutionary spiral, neither logically has precedence 
over the other; debating priority is about as useful as discussions about the chicken and 
the egg, for once coevolution begins, both partners are bound in co-temporal recursive 
cycles with one another” (108). There are no modern sports without technologies, and 
technology’s import is multiple. Equipment may allow for the sport, such as golf clubs in 
golf; technologies may enhance the sport, such as sneaker technology in basketball 
shoes or timing equipment in swim meets; the sport may even be born of technology, 
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such as NASCAR. And the evolutions of sports and technology are truly intertwined. 
Sports adapt to advancing technologies (i.e. advances in carbon fiber create lighter, 
faster bicycles), and the demands of sports prompt new technologies (i.e. moisture-
wicking antimicrobial clothing or football helmets to help reduce concussions, etc.).  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
In chapter 2, I discussed how the sport social language is embedded with a 
hierarchical dichotomy between nature and technology, preferencing what is considered 
natural over what is perceived as technological in keeping with a humanist trajectory. We 
saw how social languages are key in shaping black boxes, but in chapter 3, I want to 
develop a theoretical model that examines how several specific black boxes related to 
sports shape our attitudes toward PETs specifically and sports generally. To do that, I am 
going to build from Foucault’s disciplinary power to Scott’s disciplinary rhetoric to my own 
term that I will call disciplinary mythologies.  
 
The Various Uses of Discipline 
 
 In Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Foucault argues that in our modern 
disciplinary society, both the individual and societal bodies are controlled through 
observational practices, through techniques and procedures, through rote homogenization. 
This disciplinary power produces what Foucault calls ‘docile bodies,’ and numerous 
scholars have latched onto this term to discuss the modern athletic body with its constant 
training, sculpting, monitoring, and tracking (Markula and Pringle 2006, Shogan 1999). 
Athletes are indeed good examples of disciplinary power at work. Foucualt’s chapter in 
Discipline and Punish entitled “Docile Bodies” starts by discussing how eighteenth-century 
soldiers became “something that can be made; out of formless clay, an inapt body, the 
machine required can be constructed” (135). Although Foucault is not speaking specifically 
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about athletes, the history of sport is rife with analogies between the athlete and both the 
soldier and the machine. The analogous relationship is warranted. Whether we are talking 
about a soldier, a machine, or an athlete, the end product results from meticulous shaping, 
fine tuning, and testing. Through rigorous control and constant monitoring, a ‘docile body’ 
can be created, one that “may be subjected, used, transformed, and improved” (136). It is 
due to this idea of creating the docile body through “disciplining” that Foucault’s term 
‘disciplinary power’ is developed. The idea of ‘docility’ conventionally conveys a sense of 
weakness, something that would rarely ever be associated with modern professional 
athletes or soldiers, but Foucault’s use of the word is more about “pliability,” and he makes 
it clear that a disciplined body is one that can exert significant force and skill. Without great 
discipline over years of development, a modern athlete would not be able to achieve the 
physical feats that she is able to accomplish during professional competition. Not only is 
she disciplined in what she consumes and how rigorously she trains, but also every action 
is monitored by a coaching staff (oftentimes recorded and meticulously dissected), body 
movements are tweaked, strategies are honed, team synchronicity is built, and statistics 
are analyzed.  
In The Making of High-Performance Athletes: Discipline, Diversity, and Ethics, Debra 
Shogan examines how technologies of docility are used by coaches and trainers to create 
high-performance athletes. At the heart of Shogan’s claims is the assertion that 
constraints—what we might call the embodiment of disciplinary power—are productive 
for athletes because they prescribe certain actions and proscribe others, and it is this 
channeling of action that creates focus and skill. As a former coach, it is her assertion that 
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Foucault’s theories operate almost as a ‘how to’ manual for modern coaches. Shogan’s 
central goal is to:  
detail the technologies that go into the production or ‘making’ of high-
performance athletes and show that, through subjection to elaborate and 
minutely detailed organization of their movements, powerful athletes are 
made or produced. By powerful, [she means] not only that an athlete is able 
to perform skills with strength and at great speed, but also that an athlete is 
able to produce skilled performance that makes it possible to act on others’ 
actions (3) 
 
Shogan claims that the training of high-performance athletes is still a “modern project 
despite the fact that high-performance sports competitions now occur in a post-modern 
context or condition” (9); however, as historians of ancient-Greek athletics would be quick 
to point out, the roots of precise training go far deeper than modern times. In Bodily Arts: 
Rhetoric and Athletics in Ancient Greece, Debra Hawhee demonstrates how the Greek 
gymnasium, which is where both athletes and rhetoricians were trained, was a place that 
emphasized the three Rs of sophistic pedagogy: rhythm, repetition, and response (ch. 6). 
Hawhee uses an ancient wrestling treatise to comment on Greek training techniques and 
claims, “by going through micro-motions over and over, the wrestler will acquire a bodily 
rhythm that enables a forgetting of directives. In other words, as rhythm is achieved, 
knowledge of fundamentals becomes bodily rather than conscious, and habituation ensues” 
(ch. 6). Although a modern coach will use ever more sophisticated means to track, measure, 
and parse athletic movements, it could be argued that at the core of the training are still the 
same three Rs of sophistic pedagogy.  
Shogan uses a broad definition to ‘technologies’ similar to the one I developed in 
chapter 2, which includes as many ‘techniques’ as it does physical technologies. In doing 
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this work, she details how discipline in the coaching world—similar to the army, school, 
hospital, and workshop described in Discipline and Punish—proceeds “according to 
individuation of private space; codification of ‘correct’ actions in relation to a strict 
timetable; routinization of activities according to a training schedule of increasing 
difficulty, followed by an examination to test abilities; and synchronization of individuals 
into a collective” (19).  
However, a docile body is not solely formed through physical manipulation. As 
Shogan notes, there are two meanings of “discipline” in this context, one being the 
technologies and techniques used to train the athlete’s body, and the other being a body of 
knowledge—a discipline. It is this second meaning of discipline that I am also concerned 
with in this chapter as it has to do with discourse. For Foucault, analyzing discourse was 
central to understanding how knowledge is formed. It is through discourse (as the building 
blocks of a discipline) that the perception17 of stability and continuity can be achieved in 
human sciences and social structures (Markula and Pringle, 2006, 29).  Of course, as with 
most of Foucault’s theories, power relations come into play, and he writes “there is no 
power relation without correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge 
that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations” (1979, 27). In 
interpreting this power-knowledge relationship, Shogan claims that “discourses of the 
discipline of high-performance sport provide the information that makes control of bodies 
possible. Through this control more knowledge is generated for coaches and scientists. This 
                                                        
17 Although Foucault makes it clear in The Archaeology of Knowledge that stability and 
continuity are only outward projections. Performing an archaeology of knowledge shows 
the many gaps, contradictions, and confusions in a work or discipline, and it is only 
discourse that smoothss over those inconsistencies.  
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is knowledge about the athlete—observed, measured, and recorded by experts—but it is 
also knowledge embodied by athletes who can, then, exercise power through skill” (11). So 
Shogan recognizes the importance of discourse in our perceptions and use of PETs, and 
disciplinary techniques are made possible first through disciplinary discourse.  
Although there are numerous consequences of this kind of disciplinary power, one 
is that once a discipline (a body of knowledge that one studies and specializes in) is formed, 
its boundaries are guarded through power relations. Not just anyone can have a voice 
within a discipline. Foucault wrote “medical statements cannot come from anybody; their 
value, efficacy, even their therapeutic powers, and, generally speaking, their existence as 
medical statements cannot be dissociated from the statutorily defined person who has the 
right to make them, and to claim for them the power to overcome suffering and death” (51). 
Shogan expands on this by saying, “statements by doctors within the discourse of medicine 
are taken seriously as knowledge, statements by patients are taken less seriously, and 
statements by homeopaths are not countenanced at all” (12). When speaking of the health 
field, I do not disagree with Shogan in her evaluation. Perhaps it is because of the level of 
schooling and technical knowledge required to become a doctor or because of the intricate 
inner workings of the human body that are, for the most part, withheld from average sight 
(and, thus, remain mysterious) by a layer of skin to all those except a select few, but 
medical discourse is one area closely regulated by disciplinary boundaries. However, to 
equate the position that doctors hold in the medical field to the position that coaches or 
sports scientists hold in the sports field is a bit misleading. Shogan claims “by virtue of their 
expertise, coaches and sport scientists control the discourse of high-performance sport and 
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determine what is to count as legitimate talk or truth about sport discipline” (12-13). 
Perhaps Shogan is correct here if we are speaking narrowly about discourse on how to 
hone an athlete into an elite professional. Much of that process is governed by scientific 
data from the disciplines of sports science and health science and best practices established 
by experienced practitioners. However, to extend this claim beyond the bounds of strictly 
the training of elite athletes to encompass discourse about sport in general would be a 
mistake. As we saw in Chapter 2, many voices—such as sport writers/commentators, fans, 
athletes, administrators, sport governing bodies, and even congressional members—
comprise the discourse around sports competition and PETs more specifically. For 
instance, rules committees that are part of sport governing bodies are primarily the ones 
that decide what PETs will and will not be incorporated into the fabric of the game at a 
professional level. Those committee members are often made up of administrators that 
have limited or no experience actually coaching or training elite athletes, and their 
decisions evolve out of discussions concerned with far more than simply scientific data or 
best practices, such as what the product will look like on television, what the fans want and 
what will generate more viewership, corporate endorsements and sponsorship, safety 
issues, player unions and ownership interests, and a cadre of other concerns and 
stakeholders. These discussions are informed by coaches and sports scientists, but also just 
as much by athletes, fans, corporations, sports commentators, and other interested parties. 
One cannot say that any or all of these other voices are considered valid within the context 
of the sport-science discipline or even using the language of a discipline. Of course, you 
could argue that there are many voices that speak about a discipline from outside the 
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legitimized interior. Shogan mentions one when she cites homeopaths, and we could add a 
whole host of voices that include family members of sick individuals, social commentators, 
insurance corporations, and others. But whereas the inner workings of the human body are 
restricted from view accept by an elite few, many can watch a sport and make judgements 
about the competition or result. Millions of people participate in sports from a young age 
and/or watch sports religiously every week. There is a sense of knowledge, a sense of 
ownership that comes with sporting knowledge that does not exist with health 
knowledge18. And although these voices may not be considered “experts” from within the 
sports-science discipline, they are, nonetheless, contributing to the discourse that shapes 
our perceptions about sport. Whereas few question the expertise of an experienced doctor, 
every single disgruntled sports fan will question the expertise of the team coach.  
 The other problem with looking through the lens of an established discipline is that 
there is often a sense that those within the discipline are diviners of “truth.” Shogan echos 
this when she says “coaches and sport scientists control the discourse of high-performance 
sport and determine what is to count as legitimate talk or truth about sport discipline” (12-
13). Again, this may be true when it comes to determining what fits within the classification 
of sports discipline, but the use of the word “truth” implies a value-free divination that 
simply does not exist. Here we see echoes of what Harraway calls the culture of no culture; 
it is a fetishism of sport science, and those within the borders of a discipline often suffer 
from this sort of fetishism. Shogan also claims, “when legitimate speakers of a discourse 
communicate their knowledge and this knowledge is taken seriously by participants in the 
                                                        
18 It is worth noting that sports are intended to be viewed widely, whereas medicine 
is not.  
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discourse, what they say is also understood to be true. In producing knowledge, power 
produces truth” (12). By saying later that coaches and sports scientists control the 
discourse of high-performance sport, Shogan is claiming that only coaches and sports 
scientists shape what we perceive to be true about sport, but that simply is not true.  
 Here it would be useful to draw a distinction between Shogan’s purpose and my 
own. As evidenced by the title of her book, The Making of High-Performance Athletes, 
Shogan is speaking from within the discipline that is concerned with how to train and 
create athletes. We can call it the sports-science discipline, and as she claims, sports 
scientists and coaches form the core of those accredited to speak from within this 
discipline. However, as I have attempted to show, the discourse of sports expand well 
beyond this narrow discipline. My own purpose is more clearly articulated as an analysis of 
the discourse around sports competition than strictly the sports athlete. To frame this 
perspective, I will turn to Hawhee’s discussion of the agôn in the opening chapter of Bodily 
Arts. Hawhee claims that in ancient Greek culture, the importance of the agôn cannot be 
overemphasized. Translated as a “gathering” or “assembly,” the agôn was the place where a 
struggle or contest took place. This is differentiated from the athlios, which is the term the 
Greeks used for the actual outcome-driven competition. We could characterize Shogan’s 
approach more in line (although not precisely) with athlios. The Olympic Games as a whole 
are the exemplar for agonism, with its gathering of athletes, judges, and spectators. Hawhee 
argues that agonism is tied inextricably to aretê, “a kind of virtuousness that in its own way 
drove agonistic encounters, as Greeks sought after the esteem of others through 
competitive engagement and display of their abilities” (ch. 1). Hawhee goes on to 
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characterize aretê as “virtuosity,” instead of its more traditional description as having to do 
with “virtue.” Aretê requires onlookers, an audience that can confirm the virtuosity of the 
performance. Thus, aretê is linked to agonism since the agôn presents the athlete with an 
appropriate time and place to achieve aretê. To put it into terms I developed in Chapter 2, 
the agôn is the place where sport in the making occurs, where all of the various forces at 
work in a sports competition come together and allow an opportunity for an athlete to 
achieve virtuosity. However, the agôn does not end at the border between sport in the 
making and ready made sport. As Hawhee explains, “agonism denotes an encounter, the 
production of a response, and a subsequent change in both substances” (ch. 1). If the agôn 
is the place where athletes and onlookers meet, where an athletic event causes an 
interaction and change among all interested parties (i.e. coaches, athletes, fans, sport 
scientists, commentators, corporations, etc.), then that is where the sports discourse gets 
(re)negotiated and where sports myths flourish. For that reason, agonistic competition and 
training is the primary discursive-material context for my analysis.  
 Discourses are one of the building blocks of a discipline. They occur at a more basic 
level, one that is more accepting of various voices. Foucault uses the term discourse in 
several different ways and suggested that this varying use was not caused by imprecision 
but was a strength of the term because it shows the concept’s complexity. Markula has a 
useful discussion of Foucault’s three uses of discourse and how they can be viewed in a 
sports context. The first use refers to general statements that come together in specific 
social contexts to form meaning. For example, certain descriptions, which would be 
considered discourses, can be used to describe a soccer ball. That doesn’t mean that a 
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tangible soccer ball does not exist, but without the discourse, we would not be able to 
recognize it as such. Foucault argues that “the objects of discourse (e.g. soccer) and the 
discourse that constitute those objects (e.g. discourses of soccer) emerge at the same time” 
(30). The second use of discourse refers to “an individualisable group of statements or to 
statements that refer to the same phenomenon” (30). In this case, we would be talking 
about all the discourses that make up soccer. Far from being unified, these discourses can 
reflect a wide range of cultural, social, and practical perspectives (e.g. the way we perceive 
soccer in the US is different from the way they view soccer in the UK), but they work to 
distinguish soccer from everything else (e.g. it is soccer, not American football or hockey). 
Foucault’s third use of the term discourse is defined as a “’regulated practice that accounts 
for a certain number of statements.’ By this usage he is referring to the unwritten ‘rules’ 
that guide social practices and help to produce and regulate the production of statements” 
(Foucault, qtd in Markula, 31).   
 It is this third use of discourse that is most relevant to my current analysis as I will 
attempt to show how the unwritten rules are interwoven with myths. We can draw a lot of 
parallels between Foucault’s use of discourse here and the use of ‘social language’ that I 
developed in Chapter 2. We can consider both of them as a way to describe the medium of 
exchange for conversations within individualized spheres. Although they are not exactly 
the same, in the context that I’m using them, Foucault’s third definition of discourse and my 
development of social language could be used interchangeably. However, I prefer using 
social language because it more effectively implies an enacted experience. Since it is ‘social,’ 
it conveys a dialogical interplay; it shifts with the crowd. A discourse, like a canon, can 
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seem fixed, as if it were determined by committee and is now immovable. Of course, that 
clearly is not how Foucault would interpret the term since discourse, according to him, is 
situated in a particular moment and context. Still, the term often has that connotation. And 
using social language helps to avoid confusion between Foucault’s differing definitions of 
discourse.  
In either case, if a speaker wishes to converse about a particular subject, he should 
be fluent in the social language in order gain entrance into the dialogue. The discourses, 
spoken through the social language, can become codified into a discipline by those 
credentialed to do so, but unlike a rarified discipline, anyone can speak into the discourse 
as long as they use the proper social language. You don’t need to be credentialed. There is 
no way to control the discourse, at least not in regards to barring someone from entering it. 
Instead, effective use of the shared social language works as the key to open the door to the 
discussion. When speaking of disciplinary power, Shogan says, “within any discourse only 
certain statements are possible because they and not others are prescribed by the rules of 
the discourse,” and although I disagree with Shogan’s later statements that coaches and 
sports scientists control the discourse, I agree with her here as long as we acknowledge 
that the “rules of the discourse” is another way of describing the social language.  
  
 
 
Of Piety and Terministic Screens 
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 As we have seen, disciplinary power is created both through practices and through 
discourse, but the discourses within particular spheres and contexts is what allows us to 
understand the practices. Discourse, or social language, is the undercurrent of a discipline, 
and as we saw in Chapter 2, a social language is highly associative. Sports are associated 
with the ‘natural’ and the ‘normal’ despite the fact that modern sports are neither natural 
nor normal. However, I would argue that to think of these relationships as merely 
associative is to underestimate their strength and endurance. Simple associations can be 
made and broken routinely. For example, if I have a bad experience with a particular food, 
say a bout of food poisoning, just the smell of the food in the near future can cause my 
stomach to tighten. But given enough time, will power, or an equally positive interaction 
with that same food, and the association is broken. The idealized relationship between 
sport and nature—in that sports are expressed as pure only when they are perceived as 
natural—is not an association that can be easily changed. It is embedded deep within our 
social psyche, and it affects our perceptions of all things sports related in ways that are 
both subtle and profound. A more effective way to view this relationship than mere 
association is to consider Burke’s use of the term ‘piety.’ Breaking the term out of its usual 
religious connotation, Burke describes piety as “the sense of what properly goes with what” 
(1954, 74). And although these connections are clearly associative, Burke uses the word 
‘linkage,’ which I feel better expresses the deep emotional and formative connection 
between the paired perceptions. Burke spends time showing that pious linkages do not 
follow what we might consider typical logic; they follow a logic all their own, governed by 
the social language. In describing this relationship, Burke states, “if a man who is a criminal 
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lets the criminal trait in him serve as the informing aspect of his character, piously taking 
unto him all other traits and habits that he feels should go with his criminality, the criminal 
deterioration which the moralist with another point of view might discover in him is the 
very opposite of deterioration as regards to the tests of piety” (77). Thinking in terms of 
Burke’s piety offers some justification why the connection between sport and nature, which 
when exposed appears blatantly illogical, can have such deep roots in the social language. 
These are linkages that one unknowingly adopts when taking up a social language and 
entering a conversation within a particular sphere, and Burke believes that it takes an act 
of will to adopt a deliberately impious perspective (72). In a sense, piety is the default 
position, and you must break with the social language and its piety in order to challenge the 
logic of it.  
 More than just linking two ideas together, Burke claims that a pious linkage creates 
an associative chain that builds perceptions. He says, 
It leads to construction in this way: If there is an altar, it is pious of a man to 
perform some ritual act whereby he may approach this altar with clean 
hands. A kind of symbolic cleanliness goes with altars, a technique of 
symbolic cleansing goes with cleanliness, a preparation of initiation goes 
with the technique of cleansing, the need of cleansing was based upon some 
feeling of taboo—and so on, until pious linkages may have brought all 
significant details of the day into coordination, relating them integrally with 
one another by a complex interpretative network (75).  
 
So one association leads to the next which leads to the next, eventually creating a world 
view. We could show a similar construction using a PET example. For instance, we can say 
the human body is natural. Since sport involves natural bodies challenging themselves for 
supremacy, the spirit of which is as natural as human nature, anything that makes the body 
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unnatural taints both the human and the sport. A technology (which by definition is 
unnatural) that alters the natural human body must therefore be considered both unnatural 
and unfair. A PET such as an anabolic steroid, which clearly alters the body, is thus an unfair 
advantage and contrary to the spirit of sport. This type of advantage needs to be regulated 
out of sports and marked as a plight on society. There are many flaws in this statement’s 
logic, not the least of which being that modern sports are anything but natural and that 
technology is not contrary to the spirit of sport (in fact, it is often through technology that 
sport is made possible), but the pious linkages abide by their own logic. According to 
Hawhee when discussing Burke’s use of the term piety, “in other words, practices lead to 
habits that lead to more associative practices; over time the accumulation of associations 
produces a radically transformed yet finely tuned piety. Thus the body is where something 
like beliefs and even morals are formed” (2009, 70). As habits lead to practices that then in 
turn reinforce the pious linkages, Burke claims that “they drive one into ruts, and these ruts 
in turn reinforce one’s piety,” which leads to a sort of deep conviction (78).  
 The metaphor of deep ruts is useful for imagining another aspect of these pious 
linkages. If you imagine a rut deep enough for an entire body to fit in from head to toe, you 
can start to picture how limiting such a rut would be. You are limited in not only where you 
can go (i.e. straight ahead or straight back, but only along the path that the rut has laid out), 
but also in what you can perceive. Nearly everything outside the rut would be obscured 
from view. Foucault claims that a discourse (the third meaning of discourse) operates in a 
similar way. Markula summarizes Foucault’s definition by stating, “he is referring to the 
unwritten ‘rules’ that guide social practices and help to produce and regulate the 
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production of statements that, correspondingly, control what can be understood and 
perceived but at the same time, act to obscure” (31). Markula then goes on to provide a 
sporting example that illustrates this obscuring, citing how in some countries the discourse 
surrounding soccer is decidedly masculiniste and works to “limit recognition that females 
may enjoy or even participate in the sport.” At the same time, in other countries, such as 
New Zealand, the soccer discourse positions it as a game for “foreigners, gentle males, or as 
a girl’s sport,” instead positioning masculinity in the aggression and physicality of a sport 
such as rugby19. The social language in the given context (i.e. sporting discourse within 
particular nationalities, in this circumstance) works to shape perceptions not only by 
showing what properly goes with what, but also by obscuring and excluding other 
possibilities. In some sense, the second part of this equation is reminiscent of another of 
Burke’s theories: terministic screens. In Language as Symbolic Action, Burke claims that, 
“even if any given terminology is a reflection of reality, by its very nature as a terminology 
it must be a selection of reality; and to this extent it must function also as a deflection of 
reality” (1341). He goes on to use the example of a man who reports his dream to a 
Freudian, Jungian, or an Alderian therapist; although in each case he would relate the same 
dream, how it is perceived is based on the discourse that the therapist is immersed in. 
Burke comments, rather slyly, that, “it is commonplace that patients soon learn to have the 
kind of dreams best suited to the terms favored by their analysts.” The patients in this 
                                                        
19 Of course, social language is constantly shifting as the sporting discourse expands 
and evolves, and significant world happenings (often in the form of major sporting 
events) can have particularly significant impact on the current social language. Take, 
for example, the 2015 Women’s FIFA World Cup, where there was significant discourse 
arguing that the female competitors were tougher than their professional male 
counterparts.  
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example could be said to develop pious linkages as a result of the terministic screens that 
the therapists are using. It is not simply a matter of reporting a dream in a particular way; 
the patient develops a deep conviction that this is what was in the dream.  
  
From Disciplinary Rhetorics to Disciplinary Mythologies: The Case of Spira 
Shoes 
 
 Terministic screen is a useful concept as it highlights the role language plays in both 
shaping and obscuring perception, and when combined with piety, we can see how 
disciplinary discourse leads to deep conviction; however, my attempt to merge disciplinary 
power, discourse, social language, piety, and terministic screens requires a conceptual 
framework that highlights the formative relationship between our language and 
perceptions but at the same time shows how these beliefs are often formed far from the 
critical gaze and unbeknownst to the individual engaged in the social language. Scott’s 
development of the term disciplinary rhetoric is a good place to begin. In Risky Rhetoric, 
Scott counters the trend in rhetorical theory to view subjects as simply the encoders and 
decoders of discourse by shifting focus to how subjects are “constituted and shaped 
through language” (7). He uses disciplinary rhetoric to highlight this shift, and he defines 
the term as “discursive bodies of persuasion that work with extrarhetorical actors to shape 
subjects and to work on and through bodies. They are defined relationally and measured by 
their symbolic and material effects. In using the word ‘disciplinary,’ I call attention to the 
ways rhetorical frames and appeals help condition, interact with, and are conditioned by 
other cultural practices that produce subject-related effects” (7-8). My intent in this project 
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has never been to conduct a close reading of individual texts to determine their rhetorical 
tactics, which is more in line with a traditional rhetorical analysis. As I have attempted to 
show, our perceptions about PETs run deeper than that. They are part of cultural networks 
and practices that transcend a strict analysis of the language used to describe them. The 
social language around PETs work with a range of other practices and actors; for instance, 
the physical manipulations of an athlete during the training process are (in)formed by the 
technologies in use, which in turn are shaped by the sport’s rules, the sponsorship 
agreements between the athlete/team/sports governing body and corporations, and the 
medical health of the athlete. Although rhetorical analysis offers useful theories and 
analytical frames for unblackboxing PETs, it is Scott’s ‘hybrid’ approach that combines 
rhetorical theory with cultural theory that I feel best accounts for the fusion of theories that 
I have attempted to develop thus far. According to Scott, disciplinary rhetorics “have 
relational agency, defying rhetorical determinism and its too simple claim that language 
constructs reality. Disciplinary rhetorics are always already part of larger cultural 
interfaces and power alignments” (33-34). It is clear to see that the discourse surrounding 
sports in general and PETs in particular have relational agency as the pious linkages extend 
far beyond the confines of the sports arena. As shown by the congressional committees on 
steroids, the hype that follows professional athletes, the billions of dollars that circulate 
professional and collegiate sports, and the sports scandals that have made the front pages 
of tabloid magazines, sports and their relationship with PETs are part of larger cultural 
interfaces and power alignments. More so than that, Scott’s claim that “disciplinary 
rhetorics do more than simply represent or persuade subjects; they transform them, 
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shaping their self-perceptions, bodily practices, and material circumstances” rings true 
when it comes to the formative influence that social language—with its pious linkages and 
terministic screens—has on our perceptions and actions toward PETs.  
 In order to investigate how disciplinary rhetorics can aid in understanding PETs, let 
us consider the case of Spira running shoes. In 2001, Andy and David Krafsur, two brothers 
who quit their jobs as a lawyer and aerospace engineer, started a small athletic shoe 
company called Spira. Several years later, they released what would be become their 
primary offering in the industry—a running shoe that incorporated a proprietary 
mechanical spring design in the heal and sole of the shoe. The company’s claim is that the 
spring design is intended to improve a runner’s recovery time by decreasing the amount of 
physical stress felt by the body from each foot strike. The spring absorbs some of the strain, 
which allows the runner to feel less fatigued and help with soreness and recovery, 
especially during longer runs. Currently on Spira’s website, they have linked a published 
research study conducted at the Northern Alberta Institute of Technology (Riess 2014) that 
tested whether a mechanical spring design would have any effect on a runner’s economy, 
and the study found that runners using the mechanical spring design did have a lower 
oxygen consumption, indicating an improvement in running economy over traditional 
running shoes. The study goes on to claim that the results indicate a marathon runner 
could reduce her time by four minutes using a shoe with the mechanical spring design. So if 
a mechanical spring does improve an athlete’s performance, what prevents all 
manufacturers from producing shoes with similar technology? This is where the 
controversy begins.  
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 USA Track & Field, which is the governing body for most sanctioned running events 
in the US, has an extensive rule book that applies to any of its events. Rule 143.3 reads: 
A competitor may compete in bare feet or with footwear on one or both feet. 
The purpose of shoes for competition is to give protection and stability to the 
feet and a firm grip on the ground. Such shoes, however, must not be 
constructed so as to give the competitor any unfair additional assistance, 
including the incorporation of any technology which will give the wearer any 
unfair advantage, such as a spring or similar device. 
 
The rules for the International Association of Athletics Federations, the international 
governing body for running events, reads the exact same way as the USATF except that in 
2005 the IAAF rule was amended to remove the specific reference to springs and instead 
states that all shoe types must be approved for competition. Here we see where a 
document not intended for persuasive purposes (a rule book) has a tremendous impact on 
how we perceive technology in relation to sports. It uses both the phrases “unfair 
additional assistance” and “unfair advantage” without ever clarifying what it means by 
“unfair.” The use of the word unfair implies an imbalance between competitors; one athlete 
has access to a technology that another athlete does not. However, the rule clearly is not 
about addressing an accessibility issue. Spira will sell its shoes to anyone, and they are not 
even any more expensive than any other high-end running shoe. This is not an issue of one 
athlete having access to a technology that another does not. Instead, this is an issue of the 
USATF concerned that technology is infringing too much in what is imagined as a purely 
human endeavor. The phrase “unfair additional assistance” is telling in this regard. The 
unfairness comes when the technology provides assistance beyond what is considered 
“natural.” The fact that the USATF rule indicates springs specifically presupposes that a 
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spring by its very essence is both unfair and provides an advantage. The other issue with 
the rule’s wording is that it declares a running shoe’s only acceptable purpose is to provide 
protection, stability, and grip. However, if that was the real purpose behind a competitive 
shoe, why even have an industry for athletic sneakers? A pair of walking boots could 
provide just as much protection, stability, and grip as any running shoe. The fact is that 
running shoes have seen tremendous technological development over the last 30 years, 
and shoe companies are constantly attempting to provide a more technologically advanced 
shoe that will reduce running times. The goal is not just protection; it is to impact 
performance. They even incorporate spring-like technologies into the heal; they have just 
done it though means other than actual springs up to this point (e.g. cushioned heels of 
various designs and materials that provide spring and impact absorption—I personally 
own a pair of competition running shoes with a carbon fiber “shank” that is supposed to 
add more forward spring to the runner). All running shoes are intended to affect 
performance, but the language of the rule implies that the shoe (and technology by 
extension) must somehow remain a non-factor in the race results.  
 Although Spira lobbied to have the USATF rule amended, it remains the same20. 
This prompted Spira to launch its “Banned for Boston” ad campaign before the 2006 
Boston Marathon, offering a $1 million award for anyone who could win the marathon 
while wearing a pair of the “outlawed” shoes. The campaign brought Spira a lot of attention, 
and they were featured on ABC, NBC, and Fox News networks at the time. Several runners 
even competed in the marathon wearing the bright yellow Spira shoes. To date, no first-
                                                        
20 The 2014/2015 USATF rule 143.3 reads the exact same way, and the organization has 
made no claim that they have any intention of altering its wording.  
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place finisher in any USATF or IAAF race has been disqualified for wearing Spira shoes, and 
the USATF has claimed numerous times that the Spira shoes are not actually banned. 
However, Andy Krafsur, who was a lawyer before starting Spira, has stated in numerous 
interviews that it does not matter what the USATF claims publicly; the rule itself bans any 
use of a spring since it specifically mentions springs as a technology that provides an unfair 
advantage. Krafsur believes that anyone who finishes second to someone wearing a pair of 
Spiras would have legal grounds for winning a lawsuit based on how the rule is phrased.  
 Reactions to the “Banned in Boston” campaign were mixed. On the one hand, sales of 
Spira shoes jumped immediately after the marathon, from a typical 300 orders per day to 
5,700 immediately after the race (Mrkvicka, 2007). The company’s website received an 
average of 150,000 hits per day during the weeks following, up from an average of 20 
visitors per day beforehand. Clearly, much of this attention can be attributed to the national 
media coverage the company received as a result of the marketing campaign, but just the 
novelty of a spring in the shoe does not seem like enough to generate such a large spike in 
the sales. As I have said, numerous other companies have spring-like running shoes, 
including Nike’s Shox launched in 2000. It would seem that the “Banned in Boston” slogan 
along with its corresponding tagline, “Ban Me! If you can catch me” was effective because it 
lends credibility to the performance-enhancing claim of the shoe. If consumers believe the 
shoe has been banned, they will feel it must have been banned for a reason (even though it 
was not officially banned at all). The implied reason why any sneaker (or equipment or 
substance) is banned is that there is clear evidence that it provides a performance 
enhancement significant enough to be considered unfair. Many runners were drawn to the 
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sneaker for exactly the kind of performance enhancement that the “banned” slogan 
promises. This is especially true for amateur and casual runners since society does not hold 
them accountable to the same standards of fair play that it does for professional athletes. 
As for professional runners, the threat early on of being disqualified for wearing Spiras was 
something that had to be considered, and many top-tier runners already had endorsement 
contracts with rival shoe companies. Nonetheless, several runners were seen leading the 
2006 Boston Marathon early on while wearing Spiras (they faded later in the race), and as 
the specter of disqualification lessened in the coming years as USATF demonstrated that 
they clearly had no intention of disqualifying anyone for wearing the shoe, more 
professional runners adopted the Spira sneaker. In the 2008 Olympic marathon, at least 
three international runners used Spira to compete. On their website, Spira claims that over 
200 races have been won with their footwear.  
 Whether professional or amateur, Spira convert or not, the shoe technology and 
Spira’s ad campaign altered the way many runners approached training and competition. 
“Energy transfer” and its effect on minimizing fatigue and improving performance became 
a more prominent consideration. The trend in competition footwear over the last few 
decades was toward more minimalist shoes—lighter and more breathable was where it 
was going. And although shoe weight and breathability are still important factors, many 
runners are now looking for a shoe that also reduces the concussive forces felt by the 
muscles during a race. As demonstrated by the Riess study, “running economy” has become 
an issue that runners now monitor and attempt to improve on through training and 
technology.  
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 Although Spira saw a jump in its sales after the Banned in Boston marketing, not 
everyone was receptive to the campaign. Many long-time runners disapproved of what 
they saw as a blatant disregard for the rules. Others railed against the performance-
enhancing qualities. In an article published by ESPN, Steve Vaitones, a referee for the 
Boston Marathon in 2006, remarked that Spiras were clearly performance enhancers 
because “if you recover faster that means you can run more easily, which means that over 
time you can run faster and farther. Steroids don’t allow you to see the baseball better, but 
if you hit it, it might go 20 to 30 feet more, which could be the difference between a home 
run and an out” (Rovell, 2005). Vaitones’s comments are representative of the kind of 
technophobia so prevalent in discourse about PETs. It fears the emerging technology as an 
encroachment on what is otherwise considered pure or natural; however, in order to 
accomplish this argument, a ‘forgetting’ must take place of the role that current technology 
already plays in the sport, technologies that have already been accepted—blackboxed—
and can therefore become transparent. Vaitones’s first statement about Spiras allowing a 
runner to recover faster, which in turn allows him to run faster and farther, could be 
applied to a number of technologies. What is Gatorade if not a way for an athlete to recover 
faster in order to perform better? One could argue that Gatorade21 only replaces what the 
body naturally loses during competition, but the fact remains that the effect of competition 
on the body is part of competition. No sporting event attempts to only measure the athlete 
at peak performance; it measures the athlete throughout the course of the event, and 
athletes are praised or critiqued based in part on how their body is able to respond after 
                                                        
21 Gatorade’s own advertising over the years does not position the product as merely a 
way to recover what the body has lost.  
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extensive physical exertion. Gatorade is a technological mediator for this process of loss 
and replenishment, and the sport social language allows a certain level of technological 
mediation in this process22. A pair of running shoes that reduce the amount of impact, and 
therefore fatigue, that the body feels could be said to be fulfilling a similar role. Gatorade 
helps a runner recover faster, and so do Spiras (if the company’s claims are believed). The 
same could be said for compression fabrics, which have been widely accepted within 
running culture and have been shown to improve blood flow, reduce vibrations, and, as a 
result, reduce fatigue. And to a lesser degree, the same argument could be made for 
moisture-wicking materials.  
 The discourse embedded in the Vaitones quote exemplifies a dividing practice, one 
of the three modes of objectification that Foucault argues are part of knowledge creation. It 
separates what is considered acceptable or ‘normal’ technological intrusions in sport from 
what could be called ‘abnormal.’ In other words, ‘normal/natural’ and ‘abnormal’ are 
mapped onto ‘fair’ and ‘unfair.’ Foucault claims that dividing practices are established 
primarily through the workings of discourse and the related development of institutions 
(e.g. prisons or asylums to separate criminals or the mentally insane from normal citizens). 
As I have attempted to demonstrate throughout this chapter, the discourse part of the 
equation is fairly clear here, and although we cannot point to a traditional “institution” 
(government sanctioned) as part of this sport discourse, there are definitely corporate 
institutions at work. When it comes to sports technology and equipment, no other company 
has the global domination that Nike has, and Nike has a significant role (even if that role is 
                                                        
22 If science were able to prevent athletes from losing electrolytes at all, I’m sure 
this would be seen as an unacceptable PET, at least at first.  
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passive) in creating the knowledge-power that shapes perceptions about PETs. In the 
specific example of Spira, Krafsur has claimed in numerous interviews that Nike’s 
relationship with the USATF has contributed to the organization’s refusal to change the 
language in the sneaker regulation. It is hard to deny the close relationship between Nike 
and the USATF. Nike is the official apparel sponsor of the USATF, and the former CEO of the 
USATF, Craig Masback, who ran the organization when Spira originally attempted to get the 
rule changed and during the ‘Banned in Boston’ campaign, eventually resigned from his job 
to take a position as Director of Business Affairs at Nike (Johnson, 2008). Although Krafsur 
does not believe that Nike is actively attempting to block Spira (Spira is too small for Nike 
to take notice), he has claimed that, “Masback and his legions have been working to protect 
their main benefactor against any real or perceived threats […] those in the industry who 
depend on Nike and feel the need to protect them, like the USATF, are very concerned and 
threatened by us […] The same holds true for the big marathons and races and their 
directors who wish to protect their shoe sponsors and the USATF relationship” (Johnson 
2008). We can only speculate how the Spira wave-spring technology would have been 
received if it was introduced by Nike instead of a small start-up company in El Paso, Texas, 
but we can get a hint by looking at Nike’s Shox sneakers that were released several years 
before Spira was formed. In Nike’s own literature, the Shox technology is described as “a 
revolution in cushioning and impact protection. Nike Shox technology provides an optimal 
environment for cushioning, a slower rate of impact loading (helping reduce the risk of 
impact-related injuries) and a uniquely responsive feel. The highly resilient foam in Nike 
Shox columns is made of energy-efficient material that enhances durability and spring […] 
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The springs in the Nike Shox are specially patented, hollowed-out columns.” It is interesting 
that even though the Shox sneakers do not use a traditional metal spring like the Spiras use, 
the columns are still referred to as ‘springs’ in the Nike literature, both in how the column 
is termed and the effects that it provides. Despite the fact that Shox are described similarly 
to the Spiras in both the technology used and the intended benefits (reducing impact-
related injuries, energy efficiency, etc.), the Shox received none of the controversy that the 
Spiras received. Of course, much of the controversy was of Spira’s own making with the 
‘Banned in Boston’ campaign, but you have to wonder if the USATF would have been more 
willing to adjust the language of the sneaker rule if Nike had been the one requesting the 
change. Would Vaitones have made the same performance-enhancement claims against the 
Nike Shox that he did against the Spira shoes? At the very least, it is clear that Nike plays a 
significant role in the knowledge-power that generates discourse about PETs in sports, 
especially when it comes to sporting equipment.  
 Another way Vaitones’s quote demonstrates a dividing practice is that it uses 
discourse that groups together technologies that are considered highly objectionable. We 
see this in the second half of the quote where he implies a connection between the Spira 
technology and steroid use. Although he is not saying that the Spira sneakers are the same 
as steroid use, by placing the two technologies next to each other, he is making a case 
against Spiras by drawing on the same narratives that shape arguments about PEDs. 
Interestingly, the ESPN article where Vaitones’s quote appears uses the tagline “Juiced 
shoes” to promote the story, clearly drawing on the same discourse used in conversations 
about PEDs.  In fact, many of the arguments about PETs are built on previous narratives, 
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oftentimes where the link between narratives is specious. The link between a spring 
inserted in a shoe and a performance-enhancing drug is tenuous at best. And yet, the sport 
social language is one that routinely draws on past narratives to build current arguments. 
The sports world is an industry fixated on story-telling, and the stories are central to the 
creation of power-knowledge. The retelling of a sports event is never strictly about the 
results or statistics; it is about narratives of heroes and villains, about overcoming 
incredible odds or crumbling in the face of adversity, about human excellence or human 
frailty. Latour remarks that science discourse generates narratives in a similar vein—
legendary figures in science. These narratives build on one another, layer upon layer, and 
any new sporting event is measured by the narratives of the past. Is this championship 
team better than the 1986 champions? Is he the best in the sport today, or is he the best in 
the sport ever?  
 Up to this point, analyzing the discourse of sports technology through the lens of 
disciplinary rhetoric has been effective at showing how the discourse “compel[s] the 
classification, measurement, and management of subjects” (Scott, 34). However, although 
disciplinary rhetoric or disciplinary power (or even Foucault’s archaeological 
methodology) could be used to analyze the layering narratives so prominent in sporting 
discourse, neither of those terms place the focus squarely on how the entwining of new 
narratives with older discourses affect the way we perceive and internalize the new 
narrative. To accomplish this shift in focus, I want to develop a new term: disciplinary 
mythology.  
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 I am using “disciplinary” in the same Foucauldian sense as we see with disciplinary 
power and disciplinary rhetoric. With “mythologies,” let me first be clear that I am not 
using the word in the sense of true or false. I am not making any judgments about the 
correctness or legitimacy of a claim or discourse by saying that it is a ‘myth,’ but I will say 
that mythologies generally idealize. Instead, I am drawing on two primary senses of the 
word. First, as suggested in de Certeau, myths mark out boundaries and are formed by a 
layering of stories on top of each other. He claims, “these ‘operations of making out 
boundaries,’ consisting in narrative contracts and compilations of stories, are composed of 
fragments drawn from earlier stories and fitted together in makeshift fashion (bricoles). In 
this sense, they shed light on the formation of myths, since they also have the function of 
founding and articulating spaces” (122-23). The narrative, always already present in the 
discourse, is what is important here, and as new narratives are formed, pieces of the 
discursive mythology are used to attach significance to the new story. But this is more than 
simply a comparing of old and new narratives. Mythologies that look back do not just 
provide a context for understanding the present; they shape how we perceive the present. 
Take, for example, the Vaitones quote. By juxtaposing his claim about the performance-
enhancing aspects of Spira with a statement about steroid use in professional baseball, he 
is drawing on the narratives that present PETs in a controversial and potentially illegal 
light. At the very least, it implies that Spiras are contrary to fair play and the “spirit of the 
game.” At its most basic level, this is a clear guilt-by-association fallacy, but to reduce this 
claim to a simple example of poor logical reasoning would be to underestimate the 
mythological discourse surrounding PETs, especially the use of PEDs in baseball. Myths are 
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formative—like terministic screens, they direct and deflect possibilities—but they also are 
elusive. Here I draw on another sense of the term developed by Roland Barthes in 
Mythologies. Although they shape our perceptions, myths often remain unacknowledged 
and unexamined. In this sense, they are similar to black boxes that have been closed. All we 
care about is the input and output; the inside remains unseen. We assume that they are a 
solid and reliable foundation, but as Latour would argue, this is a house of cards. In this 
context, I use the term disciplinary mythologies to describe a disciplinary rhetoric that 
shapes through entwined narratives an idealized kind of knowing. They map the way 
things are onto the way we want things to be based on the values embedded in our shared 
social language. Like disciplinary rhetorics, these mythologies transform subjects by 
shaping perceptions, actions, and circumstances.  
 In the next chapter, I will focus more specifically on how disciplinary mythologies 
effect our arguments about PETs by exploring the specific example of LZR swimsuits during 
the years surrounding the 2008 Beijing Olympics. I will show how mythologies are what 
allow us to create a term like “technological doping,” and I will explore two specific types of 
disciplinary mythologies that are particularly prevalent in the PETs social language: The 
Nostalgia Enthymeme and The Level-Playing-Field Topos. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
What Does the Posthuman Wear to the Pool?: A Case Study for Disciplinary 
Mythologies 
 
In early 2008, Speedo released a new line of swimsuits aimed at the 
competitive athlete and called them LZR (pronounced “Laser”) Racer Suits. Over the 
next two years, as world records fell left and right to swimmers wearing the new 
generation of swimsuits, controversy over the role of technology in swimming steadily 
increased, eventually leading FINA, the international regulatory body for swimming, to 
ban the LZR and other such swimsuits from international competition at the start of the 
2010 competition season. In the process, discourse that condemned the swimsuit grew 
in intensity. This two-year period marks an interesting case study for disciplinary 
mythologies in sports as swimming, a sport that historically has remained somewhat 
sheltered from controversial conversations about PETs, wrestled with how to define the 
human in light of this effective performance-enhancing technology. This chapter aims to 
examine discourse surrounding the LZR swimsuit in order to explore the significance of 
disciplinary mythologies in shaping our beliefs about PETs. First, I will show how the 
main opposition to the LZR technology, which often took the form of discourse claiming 
that the suits were “technological doping,” stem from a disciplinary mythology 
entrenched in other doping discourse. From there I will then examine two other forms 
that disciplinary mythologies often take, what I am calling the level-playing-field topos 
and the nostalgia enthymeme.  
The LZR was an advancement from Speedo’s previous generation of 
competitive swimming suit, the Fastskin bodysuit, that was released in 1999 and 
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marketed as a significant evolution in competitive swimwear. When introduced, the 
Fastskin altered the way swimmers viewed the purpose behind a swimsuit. Far from the 
minimalist swimsuits seen during the 1980s and 1990s (including the Fastskin’s 
predecessor, the Speedo Aquablade) that merely (and barely) covered sexual organs, 
the Fastskin—with its neck to knee coverage and compression-material construction—
claimed to offer a competitive advantage over all other swimsuits available at the time. 
In her chapter titled “Enhancing the body from without: Artificial skins and other 
prosthetics” (2009), Magdalinski examined the arguments made about the Fastskin and 
the early reception of the LZR. She cites how in both cases, the technology sparked 
concerns “about the body, the level playing field and the integrity of sport that 
dominated public discussion of elite performance sport throughout the 1990s. In short, 
there was confusion about which side of the nature/artifice binary this ‘device’ should 
reside” (112). Magdalinski claims that much of the discussion revolved around the 
‘fairness’ of the swimsuit, generally concerning issues of accessibility (i.e. one athlete 
having access to the suit while others did not). Not long after the Fastskin’s initial 
release in late 1999, USA Swimming banned the suit from the 2000 National Trials 
while citing “fairness to all participants.” However, athletes were eager to gain any 
racing advantage, and the Fastskin soon became a mainstay in competitive races. 
When the LZR was released in 2008, “the primary concern about fairness again focused 
on the ‘level playing field’ in terms of access” (113). This time around, the main issue 
seemed to center on athletes who were prohibited from obtaining the suit because of 
exclusive apparel contracts with other manufacturers, but this issue faded quickly as 
coaches urged athletes to forgo the money in favor of the gold medal. By the time the 
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2008 Beijing Olympics began, nearly every competing swimmer was wearing the LZR 
swimsuit. Magdalinski claims that “few have questioned the broader relationship 
between sport and technology and what it may signify within the context of Fastskin […] 
Despite isolated efforts to link Fastskin technology with performance enhancing drugs, 
the fundamental concept of the suits has not been interrogated in the same way that 
chemical or hormonal manipulation regularly is” (113-14). However, as I will show, 
Magdalinski was making this claim before swimming records started falling and the 
clamor of “technological doping” grew to its peak.  
Technologically, the LZR was released and developed in conjunction with a 
cadre of engineering and scientific testing firms including NASA, who ran the various 
suit components through wind tunnels to test drag and fluid dynamics. The resulting 
LZR suit was a giant leap forward in swimming technology even beyond its Fastskin 
predecessor. Among its various innovations, the suit did away with traditional seams 
and used an “ultrasonic welding” process to merge the materials together, thus reducing 
the drag caused by stitched seams. It used compression technologies in key areas of 
the body, which accomplished several goals: 1) It compressed the swimmer’s body into 
a more streamlined positions; 2) Muscles that are compressed have more efficient 
oxygen flow, which causes less fatigue and pain; 3) The compression reduces muscle 
vibration in the water.  
 When it came to improving race times, the LZR suit was an unprecedented 
success. Within the first week of its launch, three world records were broken using the 
suit. At the 2008 Beijing Olympics, 94 percent of all races won were from athletes 
wearing the LZR, including the winner of every men’s event (“Time’s Best”). More 
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interestingly, 23 out of 25 world records broken during the Olympics came in the LZR 
(Paxman).  
 As a result of the LZR’s success, other manufacturers raced to catch up with the 
technology, releasing suits soon after that used 100 percent polyurethane (the LZR is 
50 percent polyurethane and 50 percent woven elastane-nylon) and incorporated 
strategically placed textured panels (similar to shark’s skin or riblets for yachts) to 
reduce viscous drag (Smith). In the following 2009 World Aquatics Championships, 
another 43 records were broken. By the time new restrictions were placed on swimsuits 
(effectively eliminating the LZR and similar suits from competition), only two world 
records remained out of 90 possible from the pre-2008 technological innovations.  
 Even though FINA decided early on not to rule against the LZR suits, the influx of 
broken world records perpetuated by the new technologies (especially the 100 percent 
polyurethane suits) garnered a lot of criticism within the swimming community. One of 
the most outspoken critics was British swimmer Rebecca Adlington, who won gold 
medals wearing the LZR suit during the 2008 Beijing Olympics. In a New York Times 
article that printed just as FINA had voted to ban the suits, Adlington is quoted as 
saying, “I would never in a million years take a drug to help me, so why would I wear a 
suit just to improve my performance?” (“Swimming Bans). Here Adlington makes clear 
reference to the “technological doping” discourse by explicitly comparing the LZR suits 
to a PED. The underlying claim is that performance enhancement—no matter what form 
it takes—runs contrary to the sporting ethos. Similarly, Dave Salo, who coached 
American swimmer Rebecca Soni, argued that the suits devalued athleticism, saying, “A 
lot of kids who aren’t in very good shape can put on one of these suits and be 
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streamlined like seals” (Swimming Bans). In this way, the suits were viewed to be a type 
of shortcut, something that less developed athletes could use to pull even with 
competitors that have spent more time honing their physique and technique. Due in 
large part to arguments such as these, FINA abruptly reversed its early ruling and 
changed the regulations for the start of 2010. At that time, the regulating body ruled that 
suits could no longer be the full body-length type, that the fabric must be a “textile” or 
woven material, and that there couldn’t be any textured surfaces other than what was 
necessary for normal construction. Many predicted that the records set during the LZR 
era would stand for decades without being challenged; however, nine world records 
were broken during the 2012 London Olympics alone, and as of June 2015, 53 world 
records have been broken at least once (multiple times in some cases) in world 
competition after the restrictions that banned LZR and similar suits. That is 
approximately 58% of the total world swimming records that have been broken since the 
end of 200923. Although it does not approach the onslaught of new records that were 
recorded during 2008-2009, the number of records that have fallen since the ban have 
surprised most critics who thought that the times set by the LZR technology would be 
nearly impossible to reproduce without the suits. According to FINA executive director 
Cornel Mar-cul-es-cu, “This demonstrates that at the end of the day it’s the quality of the 
athletes and the preparation” (Dampf).  
 The LZR is an interesting case study for several reasons. First, not only did the 
                                                        
23 As of June 2015, one record (set in 2001) remains from before the 
introduction of the LZR technology. All other records were either set during 
the 2008-2010 LZR period or have been broken since then.  
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technology have a dramatic effect on the sport, but it also came in a sport, swimming, 
that on the surface has remained rather sheltered from the “technology in sports” 
debate. As far as competition goes,24 all that’s needed is a swimsuit, goggles, and a 
body of water, and until 2008, the impact that the swimsuit had on race times was 
considered minimal. To a causal or unreflective observer, there are very few places 
where technology could exert itself, and for these reasons, swimming maintained a 
sense of “purity” in regards to its competitive essence. Perhaps only running or 
gymnastics could rival swimming as the height of human physical accomplishment, a 
perfect amalgam of physical conditioning, technique, and determination. Additionally, 
the LZR situation is a useful case study for disciplinary mythologies because of how 
concentrated the timeline is and how extreme the impact it had. The case is not unique; 
nearly all sports have had to struggle with the impact that an emerging technology has 
had on competition, but it is less common for one single technology to topple records as 
quickly as was seen with the LZR, and from a case-study standpoint, the concentrated 
timeline (only lasting two years) makes it easier to analyze the impact both before and 
after the rule change.  
 Writing before the LZR suits were banned, Magdalinski argues that the key 
reason why it received less opposition than performance-enhancing substances is 
precisely because the technology is only skin deep. She claims: 
Unlike performance enhancing substances, apparel or prosthetics provoke 
fewer concerns that the boundary between nature and artifice is being 
irreconcilably blurred. Whilst the ingestion of banned pharmaceuticals is 
thought to disrupt the purity of the athletic body, the application of 
technologies to its surface does not threaten the body’s integrity in the 
                                                        
24 Of course, a lot more technology goes into the training process.  
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same way. It would seem that the very externality of these devices 
confirms the discrete athletic body as legitimate and, above all, natural. In 
a sense, then, the purity of the body is ensured by the stability of its 
exterior border, the site where inside and out is established, where the 
body simultaneously begins and ends: its skin (110-11).  
 
Essentially, Magdalinski’s argument centers on the technology’s non-permanence. An 
athlete can remove the suit and return to his ‘normal,’ ‘unaltered’ body, whereas 
performance-enhancement substances that are internalized physically will alter the 
body on a fundamental level (although perhaps only temporarily). Of course, to claim 
that a highly trained professional athlete is either normal or unaltered no matter what he 
is wearing is a clear example of a fetishism of sport discussed in chapter two, and 
Magdalinski acknowledges that she is referencing the view of technology and the 
human as expressed “in the popular mind” (112). Regardless, her observations about a 
technology’s interiority/exteriority as an important dividing line between what is 
commonly accepted or rejected as a PET has merit, and as I will show later in this 
chapter, I believe it is tied to humanism’s centrality in the sport social language.  
 However, clearly the story does not end there. Despite the fact that the LZR is 
external to the body, it was still banned at the end of the 2009 season. Additionally, 
there are numerous technologies—Spira Shoes, for example—that have been 
embroiled in controversy despite the fact that they are used externally to the body. 
Referring back to the diagrams in Chapter 2 (Fig. 6) will be useful here. The sport social 
language shapes our understanding of technologies, fairness, and naturalness. If a 
technology is not seen as being either unfair or unnatural, it enters the black box. As 
Latour describes, with a black box, only the input and output are of a concern; the inner 
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workings become invisible. When it comes to the fetishism of sports, only “pure” 
competition is allowed as the output. However, the LZR example requires an expansion 
of the above image. As Magdalinski claims, the LZR suits received only limited 
opposition to their use. There were some concerns about the fairness when its 
accessibility was in question, but once that issue was resolved in the minds of the 
users, the technology was accepted into the competition black box. The fact that nearly 
every competitor was wearing an LZR or similar suit at the 2008 Olympics demonstrates 
that point. The reason why the LZR was eventually banned was not on the input side of 
the equation; it was on the output. Too many records fell too quickly, and this exposed 
the black box. The real impact was not felt until the World Aquatics Championships the 
year following the Beijing Olympics, but it was clear at that point that technology was 
playing a role in the sport. Taking this into account, we need to redraw the diagram as 
(Fig. 7): 
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Although a technology is able to enter the black box, meaning that the predominant 
discourse has not marked it as unfair and/or unnatural, once the competition happens, if 
the results appear too exceptional, it brings the technology back into focus, disrupting 
the perceived “purity” of the output. In this way, the technology becomes a rupture from 
the otherwise seamless purity narrative. Technology inserts itself, no longer invisible, 
and this causes a reevaluation of the unfair and unnatural filters on the input end.  
 During the 2008 Olympics, very little was said about the LZR suit other than to 
remark on its aesthetic and predominance. Most of the narrative involving technology 
and swimming was taken up by the Beijing “swimming cube,” which was touted as the 
most advanced swimming facility in the world to date. However, when the records 
continued to tumble at the World Aquatics Championship in early 2009, it became 
Competition 
Black Box 
“Pure” Competition 
Unfair 
Unnatural 
Sport Social Language 
Feedback loop after results 
Figure 7: If the competition results are so extraordinary that audiences question the 
event’s “purity,” there is a feedback loop that reopens the black box and allows the 
technology to be re-examined.  
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impossible to ignore the role of the LZR technology in the competition. If the results had 
been less dramatic, if the number of broken records had been more in keeping with past 
championships, it is likely that FINA would have stuck with its original decision not to 
ban the technology, but when the technology moves from the hazy background into 
focus, it forces open the black box and challenges the purity narrative.  
Of course, the narrative about swimming as a pure and natural athletic endeavor 
is both ahistorical and humanistic. Magdalinski acknowledges this when she says  
The swimmer’s body, increasingly exposed as the rules of modesty 
relaxed and the laws of physics were applied, visibly confirmed that the 
performance was untainted. Of course, the reality is certainly different as 
swimming has experienced extensive technological innovation. Through 
the development of, for example, low wash lane dividers, deep gutters that 
control turbulence, movable floors and bulkhead that adjust the depth and 
length of a pool, uniform recirculation of water, temperature regulation and 
air and lighting systems (Masters 2007), ‘fast’ pools are modified and 
adapted to ensure that the environment’s impact on performance is 
negligible. Similarly, swimmers’ bodies are technologically constructed as 
they are biomechanically, physiologically and psychologically analysed 
and modified to maximise their output. (112) 
 
And Magdalinski is only referencing modern innovations to the sport. Swimming, like 
every other sport, has a long and intertwined history with technology. Human beings are 
not well suited for swimming. Our upright positioning and body shape do not translate 
well to moving horizontally through water in an efficient manner. For this reason, the 
development of the modern stroke has a long and progressive history. Early on, swim 
stroke was refined through observation, generally by observing how small social groups 
(often indigenous tribes) conducted themselves in the water effectively. Although we 
certainly could characterize this type of “scientific” observation as technological 
development, a more obvious use of technology came in 1928 when swimmers were 
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first filmed under water to study swim stroke (“Development”). Around the same time, 
the Japanese used photographs to study world-class athletes, and the Japanese swim 
team went on to dominate in the 1932 Olympic Games, winning nearly half of the gold 
and silver medals. Training regimens also underwent a technological revolution as 
techniques were borrowed from track coaches trying to help runners break the 4-minute 
mile. Closer to our current time, research into the forces acting on the body as it moves 
through water (hydrodynamics and fluid mechanics) has again caused swimmers to 
change swim stroke and training techniques.  
 As we see in the LZR example, the problem is not always with technology itself; 
the problem occurs when technology makes its presence known and shatters the 
“natural” narrative. The LZR suit launched itself onto the scene so dramatically—with 
world records falling left and right—that it was impossible to ignore the technological 
origins. But no one questioned technology’s role in swimming when swim coaches used 
digital equipment to dissect every minute detail of an athlete’s positioning or turned to 
scientists to unravel the hydrodynamics of a human body in water or used simulation 
technologies to test various strokes or turned to medical science to develop 
performance-enhancing diets and training regimens or any number of other points 
where technology fused with swimming. As long as technology remains invisible in 
competition, no one deems it excessive. Australian swimming star Libby Trickett 
commented that the new suits have “taken the limelight from people’s performances 
and that’s not right” (BBC), and in an article titled “Five reasons FINA needs to ban 
high-tech swimsuits,” Chris Chase lists as one of his reasons “Because this is what 
people are talking about.” The problem thus articulated is that there is a blurring going 
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on between where the athlete’s accomplishments end and the technological 
implications begin, but if we reconfigure our viewpoint to one aligning with 
posthumanism, those two aspects are no longer distinct and needing of demarcation.   
 
‘Technological Doping’ and Other Myths 
 
 Even before the 2008-2009 racing season, some commentators had christened 
the Speedo suits as “technological doping,” but the condemnation intensified after the 
2009 World Championships. This claim about the LZR and similar suits led to the 
charge that eventually resulted in the technology being banned from competitive 
swimming. The question is how does this represent a disciplinary mythology?  
 The first part of “mythology” as I am applying it here is that it consists of a 
layering of narratives that form boundaries. In this use, “doping” is a complex term that 
involves numerous discourses. Although the exact origins of the word are not fully 
known, it first appeared in an English dictionary in 1889 and referred to a mixed remedy 
including opium that was used to “dope” horses (Muller 2009). There are also 
connections to a stimulant used by the Zulu warriors during fights and religious 
ceremonies. By 1900, it also referred to the illegal drugging of race horses to either 
inhibit or enhance performance. So from its beginning, doping has had the connotation 
of coming from outside legal or ethical bounds. During the 1960s and 1970s, doping 
became intricately tied to anabolic steroid use, partly due to the stories of steroid use 
among Olympic athletes (especially eastern-bloc countries where it was feared 
government-backed steroid programs had been developed and encouraged) and also 
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because of the rise in prominence of bodybuilding competitions. Since the controversy 
in the 1990s about illegal substances in professional sports, doping has come to stand 
in for a variety of PEDs, including EPO and genetic modification (dubbed “blood doping” 
and “gene doping,” respectively). Not until the Speedo swimming suits did the term 
technological doping gain traction.  
 Clearly, technological doping draws more from the layers of connotation attached 
to doping than it does any resemblance to the original use. First, there is the obvious 
issue of the LZR not being a PED. Until “technological doping,” the term has always 
represented some sort of internal chemical reaction. Doping was done through ingesting 
or injecting, not from wearing. There is merit to Magdalinski’s argument about the 
internal/external discourse taking place, and until the LZR was banned, you could claim 
that the reason why the “technological doping” did not have any material effect on the 
competition rules is because of its exteriority; however, remaining outside the body 
clearly was not enough of a distinction. Additionally, whereas doping has historically 
referred to an illegal or unethical practice, the term technological doping was applied 
long before the swimsuits were banned. They were certainly legal (athletes could not 
hide the fact that they were wearing the suit), and except for a few rare exceptions, the 
swimming world had accepted the suits as long as everyone had sufficient access to 
them.  
 As discussed in Barthes, here we see how doping became a myth by becoming a 
second-order semiological system. Originally, the signifier “doping” referred to the 
signified drug that was used to impact performance. If we borrow Barthes diagram from 
Mythologies, it would look like this (Fig.8): 
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As Barthes explains, the signifier and signified are not seen as two separate entities. 
They become a sign, which is the associative, relational total of the signifier and 
signified. So in this case, we have a sign that conveys the act of drugging in order to 
achieve athletic effect. As the sign is used socially over the years, it becomes pregnant 
with other relational associations: questions of legality, images of monstrous and 
1. Signifier 
Dope 
2. Signified 
Substance that impacts athletic 
performance 
3. Sign 
“Associative total” of Signifier & Signified 
Figure 8: Recreation of Barthes’s first myth diagram. 
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superhuman figures, controversy and scandal, fallen heroes and tainted records, etc. 
When that sign drifts into the realm of mythology, we have a second-order semiological 
system. In this way, the original sign becomes the signifier for the myth. It would look 
like this (Fig. 9): 
 
 
 
 
 
When something enters the realm of myth, the sign in the original construction becomes 
the signifier in the mythological construction, creating a new formation that builds from 
the associative relations of the first while also robbing the original of its history. Since 
the signifier in the myth stems from the sign of the original, the meaning is already thick 
1. Signifier 
Doping 
2. Signified 
Substance that 
impacts athletic 
performance 
3. Sign = I. Signifier 
“Associative total” of Signifier & 
Signified 
II. Signified 
 
III. Sign 
Mythology of Doping 
Language 
Mythology 
Figure 9: Recreation of Barthes’s second myth diagram. 
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with the layers of associations that contributed to the sign. There is a knowledge in myth 
that is always already present. For instance, technological doping draws on the long 
history, implication, and connotation of all forms of doping, and you cannot understand 
the term separate from these meanings. But it is a deceptive knowledge because the 
“meaning is already complete, it postulates a kind of knowledge, a past, a memory, a 
comparative order of facts, ideas, decisions” (Barthes 117). And Barthes claims earlier 
that myth “points out and it notifies, it makes us understand something and it imposes it 
on us.” This is not an open knowledge; it is a certain kind of understanding. When we 
are talking about the mythology of PETS, it is a knowledge that technology must be an 
infringement on natural sports by the very essence of technology’s artifice and sport’s 
naturalness. When we talk of “technological doping,” it brings a knowledge that 
technology, regardless of whether everyone has equal access to it, is unfair if it is seen 
to play too big a role in the outcome. These generally are not knowledges that are open 
for debate. They impose their meaning on the discourse. Barthes explains how when 
the sign in the first order (what he calls meaning) becomes the signifier in the second 
order (what he calls form), the myth drains the sign of its meaning, creating an empty, 
almost transparent shell. In this way, Barthe’s description of myth and Latour’s 
description of a closed black box are reminiscent of each other. They both replace 
complex relationships with a simplified knowledge. They both close down lines of inquiry 
and obscure what is at the heart of them. However, a key difference is in what they 
represent. Latour argues that black boxes in science are tested through a whole 
network of empirical results, citations, scholarly publications, etc., and if the black box is 
seen to run contrary to the observable evidence, the box is opened and (re)examined. 
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In this way, a black box represents reality, or at least our current, generally agreed upon 
understanding of reality. However, since myth functions within discourse and is not as 
easily challenged through laboratory experiments or observable data, it is not 
constrained by demonstratable reality. According to Barthes, “what is invested in the 
concept (what Barthes calls the second-order signified) is less reality than a certain 
knowledge of reality […] In actual fact, the knowledge contained in a mythical concept is 
confused, made of yielding, shapeless associations” (119). I would not go as far down 
the road as Barthes does in saying that the associations used in mythical concepts are 
shapeless since those employing disciplinary mythologies have specific rationales 
based on values and reasons; however, I do feel Barthes is on the right path. In 
Barthes’ model, something cannot be a myth until it has become untethered from its 
primary signification; it loses its original context and is replaced (generally over a 
lengthy period of time) with a chain of layered associations. Imagine a tight grouping of 
atoms that take the form of a coffee mug. If this image can be said to be the original 
signifier and signified, which has shape and substance in the form of a specific meaning 
and context, a myth occurs when those atoms start to drift away from each other, losing 
their original shape as they spread and link up with new, adjacent atoms. The result is 
more of a cloud than a solid object. Yes, even a cloud still has a shape, but it becomes 
much more difficult to determine the external boundaries and internal substance of that 
cloud.  
 “Technological doping,” therefore, exemplifies a type of disciplinary rhetoric that 
also incorporates characteristics of mythology. It transforms subject positions, 
classifying certain actions and human/technology interactions as outside the bounds of 
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ethical and natural sports, and, in the process, shaping everything from perceptions and 
arguments to game play and rules. But these rhetorics are themselves shaped by the 
disciplinary structure of mythology. Technological doping engages in boundary 
formation, casting judgment on a particular kind of human/technology interaction and 
doing so by piecing together in a makeshift fashion narratives (and their chains of 
associations) that are already present in the discourse and may have very little to do 
with the current subject. However, as Barthes claims, once a sign is grasped by 
mythology, it becomes a second-order semiological system. Although it draws from 
layers of narratives, within the context of myth, those narratives lose their historical 
grounding, and the concept (the mythological sign) is made of shifting, formless, and 
narrowed knowledge. “Technological doping” frames the conversation in a way that 
severely limits possible counterarguments. Doping is so vilified in the sport social 
language that anything drawing on the doping mythology becomes tainted with layers of 
negative connotation. It is a term that has immediacy, making it ideal for sound bites 
and newspaper headlines. “The meaning is already complete” (117), says Barthes, and 
the meaning in this particular example is one that draws on the same fetishism of sport 
that is so prevalent in the sport social language—technology as antithetical to the “spirit 
of sport.”  
 
The Level-Playing-Field Topos 
 
Disciplinary mythologies frame the debates taking place about PETs and direct 
the course that the arguments take, eventually resulting in real-world implications like 
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rules and perspectives. They accomplish this through a variety of means, such as 
establishing the metaphors used to foreground claims and shaping the premises and 
appeals that form the logic behind PETs discourse. To unpack how this often occurs in 
conversations about PETS, I am going to analyze two dominant disciplinary 
mythologies, the level-playing-field topos and the nostalgia enthymeme, and in relation 
to the LZR controversy.  
 A common claim about the LZR suits (and technology’s role in sports), especially 
when they were first released, was that they do not allow for “a level playing field.” 
Magdalinski remarked on this several times as an issue of access to the technology, 
and she claims that this particular argument mostly died down by the time of the Beijing 
Olympics. However, as it became clear that the LZR suits and similar technologies were 
playing a significant role in records falling, the level-playing-field metaphor became 
prominent again. In 2009, double Olympic champion Rebecca Adlington remarked 
about the technology “I think it’s a shame to be honest. Swimming always used to be a 
level playing field. The technology […] has come from nowhere. We need to go back to 
putting rules in place, just to make it a fair playing field for everyone” (“Hi-Tech”). The 
metaphor of the level playing field is used extensively in the sports discourse in a variety 
of contexts, from PETs to rules to spending caps. It goes hand-in-hand with “the spirit of 
the game” and “nature of sport.”  
 As for topos, Lawrence Prelli defines the term as a “’perspective from which to 
argue’ and a specific ‘vantage point from which to view issues, ideas, and facts’” (Scott 
61). More importantly, topoi are a way to frame debates and arguments, which is what 
the level-playing-field topos does in PETs discourse. Aristotle describes topoi in terms 
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of general and specific, with a specific topoi being situated in a specialized discourse 
(e.s. discourse of science or law or sports). In Risky Rhetoric, Scott identifies the scales 
topos, which he argues is one of the most prevalent forms of disciplinary rhetoric in HIV-
testing discourse. Essentially, the scales topos envisions the classic balance beam with 
two dishes suspended on each end (i.e. scales of justice), and it is used to weigh pros 
against cons. Through critiquing arguments within HIV-testing discourse, Scott shows 
that far from being a clear method to weigh the issues at stake, “the topos oversimplifies 
and distorts the issues surrounding testing by unnecessarily structuring them within a 
series of false binary oppositions” (69).  
 We can visualize the level-playing-field topos as a playing field (a plane) that is 
tilted in one direction or the other, forcing one set of participants to have to run uphill 
while the other set gets the advantage of running downhill. Of course, the unbalanced 
field is simply a metaphor for any kind of advantage that a competitor may obtain. It 
does not refer exclusively to the field of play. For instance, an athlete who does not 
have the same access to a technology, such as a LZR swimsuit, would be said not to be 
competing on a level playing field even though she would be swimming in the exact 
same pool as everyone else. The playing field can represent any number of 
environmental or technological advantages. There are some similarities between the 
scales and the level-playing-field topoi. Both metaphors hinge on a form of equilibrium, 
and as I will show, they both have the same end result of oversimplifying and distorting 
the issues at stake. However, whereas the scales topos is used to show pros and cons 
in an effort to persuade toward one side or the other—the scales are never completely 
balanced, nor are they intended to—the level-playing-field topos seeks total equality. It 
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is not about balancing a simple binary; there are any number of factors that come into 
play, including access, opportunity, and equality. For instance, the “deflategate” 
controversy points toward the importance of equal expectations and knowledge. During 
the 2014 NFL playoff game between the New England Patriots and the Baltimore 
Ravens, game footballs in the first half were deflated to pressures beneath the amount 
specified in the rulebook. Although everyone on the Patriots’ side has denied the 
allegations, the claim is that New England deliberately deflated the balls to make it 
easier for the quarterback to throw and receivers to catch. Even though New England 
and Baltimore would be using the exact same balls on the exact same field, if the 
allegations are true it would mean that the Patriots had foreknowledge of the deflated 
balls and could construct a game plan around this knowledge, something the Ravens 
were not privy to. This would mean the game is not played on a level playing field.  
 Although the level-playing-field topos has been used in other specialized 
discourses (i.e. business, politics, etc.), sports give the metaphor the most direct 
correlation because they are performed on an actual field of play; and the topos makes 
logical sense when it is applied to the sports playing field and environment. Magdalinski 
develops a lengthy discussion of how the sports field is shaped to ensure a level playing 
field. She claims, 
Without standardized arenas, performances are not easily compared, for 
the results may be influenced by external factors that essentially detract 
from the athlete’s ability to showcase their ‘true’ ability. Nature, then, must 
be perfected to create a fair setting that allows for the pure expression of 
biological potential. In this respect, ‘fair’ performances are thought to be 
unadorned, unaided and uninfluenced and are embedded in the idea of 
the ‘level playing field.’ This notion insists that a true measure of 
performance can only occur if all obstacles external to the competing body 
are removed from the field of competition. It is a delightful concept 
 118 
because it embodies the relationship between sport, performance, the 
body and landscape, and suggests that the internal motivation, or 
essence, of sport is essentially to compare the physical capacities of 
participating bodies. Neither the playing field, nor any other external force, 
should influence the outcome, so that the recorded performance is a pure 
reflection of the athletic capacity of the competitors […] Tracks are 
leveled, pools lose their wash, clothing becomes lighter so that the victory 
of the athlete is purely a function of their unrestricted physical efficiency. 
(26) 
 
Every effort is made to ensure the environment is controlled. When competing at 
the same time on the same field, participants will switch sides of the field 
throughout the game to make sure the same conditions (i.e. wind, sunlight, rough 
spots on the field, crowd noise, etc) are imposed on all athletes equally. Even in 
competitions where the conditions cannot be controlled fully (such as in surfing or 
long-distance ski jumping where the athletes compete separately and where part 
of the sport is the athlete negotiating these sometimes challenging environmental 
factors) steps are taken to mitigate the environment as much as possible so the 
athletes have similar, if not equal, experiences.  
 Rules serve the same purpose of leveling the playing field. If all players 
abide by the same rules, and those rules are applied equally, then, theoretically, 
all players are competing on a level playing field in the eyes of the rulebook. In 
discussing disciplinary power, Shogan demonstrates how game rules “prescribe 
certain actions, proscribe other actions, and describe boundaries or contexts 
within which these actions make sense” (4-5) in an effort to “organize space, 
time, and modality of movement and seek to homogenize participants” (8). Part 
of making sure the rules are applied equally is ensuring that all participants have 
equal access to technology, which as we saw with early arguments against the 
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Speedo swimsuits was an issue.  
 Applying the level-playing-field topos to the actual field of play and 
rulebook (including access to technology) makes sense since it ensures that all 
athletes have an equal opportunity to compete. However, problems arise when 
the topos is extended beyond the field of play and rules to include the actual 
athlete, suggesting that all participants should have an equal chance at success. 
Magdalinski claims that “the natural body is similarly regarded as immutable and 
sporting prowess innate. As such, it is not only the sporting arena that must be 
‘fair;’ the sporting body too must appear to be ‘natural’ and similarly unaided in 
the pursuit of excellence” (26). When Olympic medalist Rebecca Adlington made 
here comments about the LZR suits that “Swimming always used to be a level 
playing field […} We need to go back to putting rules in place, just to make it a 
fair playing field for everyone” (“Hi-Tech”), and in a separate interview conducted 
around the same time she said, “I would never in a million years take a drug to 
help me, so why would I wear a suit just to improve my performance” (Crouse, 
2009), she is not applying the level-playing-field topos to the field of play or the 
rules or even to the accessibility of technology since by that time any 
professional athlete could easily get their hands on a variety of advanced 
swimsuits; she is applying it to the actual athletes, implying that the technology in 
some way distorts what would otherwise be natural human endeavor, free from 
technological intervention. Here the level-playing-field topos is used to say that 
technology is somehow making a mockery or hurting the integrity of the sport. 
This usually has to do with the fear that the technology takes over and is what’s 
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really competing (i.e. the athletes become a vehicle for the technology). 
However, in this particular case, the LZR suits do not propel the athletes forward; 
they make the athlete more efficient and effective in the water. We are not talking 
about some couch potato stepping into the pool for the first time and giving the 
professional athletes a challenge; we are talking about top-tier athletes using a 
technology that helps them perform even better, but without the athlete’s years of 
training and dedication to the sport, the swimsuit would be nothing more than an 
odd fashion statement. As I have attempted to show throughout my argument, 
there is no such thing as a ‘natural’ athlete, at least not when we are talking 
about the modern, elite athlete. Technology is too intertwined with professional 
athletic performance. Magdalinski echoes this claim when she says, “Of course, 
within elite sport, there is no such thing as ‘untamed nature’ as participants have 
each been transformed by a range of technological and disciplinary practices. 
Rather than embodying freedom and expression, athletes are poked and 
prodded, tested and tamed, and measured and modified with the latest scientific 
gadgetry” (27). So if we accept the claim that all elite athletes are shaped on a 
fundamental level by technology, thus shattering any notion of a natural athlete, 
then as long as all competitors have equal access to equivalent technology, the 
technology cannot be said to have any bearing on the level playing field.  
 More insidious is when the level-playing-field topos is used as an 
exclusionary tool. This occurred with Oscar Pistorius early on when he was 
prohibited from competing with ‘able bodied’ athletes on the grounds that his 
running blades gave him an advantage because they provided more spring than 
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a human ankle joint. More interesting may be the situation of Indian sprinter 
Dutee Chand. At 18, Chand was India’s 100-meter champion in the 18-and-under 
category, but she has since been banned from competing on an international 
level against other female athletes. Chand was born with hyperandrogenism, 
which means her body produces natural levels of testosterone that are 
significantly higher than the range considered normal for women. As a result, the 
International Association of Athletics Federations, the governing body for track, 
has prohibited her from competing unless she lowers her testosterone levels 
below the male range by either taking hormone-suppressing drugs or having 
surgery to limit the amount of testosterone her body produces (Macur, 2014). 
Chand has refused to do so, and as of June 2015, she is in the process of 
appealing the prohibition. What is interesting about this case is that Chand’s 
condition is naturally occurring, and yet the level-playing-field topos is being 
applied in order to argue that Chand has an unfair advantage. When she steps 
on the track with other elite athletes, the playing field is tilted in her favor. That 
might very well be true, but the level-playing-field topos should never extend 
beyond the playing field and rules to imply that all athletes should have the same 
chance of success as their competitors. Athletes are not born equal, and sporting 
events would be much less interesting if they were. Natural, genetic gifts are part 
of athletic performance. You cannot say that a seven-foot-tall basketball player 
does not have a distinct advantage over someone who is six-foot-tall. Much has 
been said about Michael Phelps’ body proportions and double jointedness. He 
has a longer ‘wing span’ than is typical even for an elite swimmer, and his joints 
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allow for a much wider flexibility range. He has a physical advantage over most 
swimmers when he steps onto the pool deck, and in a sport where winning and 
losing is often separated by milliseconds, his physical proportions play a role. Far 
from being ‘unfair,’ this is an essential part of athletic competition.  
 The level-playing-field topos, when it is applied to every aspect of sport, 
equates positive effect with unfair. If something is believed to potentially impact 
results, it must be tilting the playing field in one direction or the other. Of course, 
this is especially potent when the effect is believed to only be achievable by a 
minority population, such as in the case of Dutee Chand, or when the effect 
appears to extend beyond what is ‘naturally’ attainable, such as with the LZR 
suits.  
  
The Nostalgia Enthymeme 
 
Complicating the situation is that sports are never solely concerned with a “level 
playing field” in this situated time and space; it also has a fascination and commitment 
to sporting ghosts. How current athletes and performance stack up against those in 
history is a significant concern to many sports enthusiasts, and some of the most 
intense sports debates center around the hypothetical comparison of today’s athletes 
against the greats from the past. Some sports are more concerned about this than 
others, but it’s certainly central to those where records and statistics figure prominently 
in the enthusiasts’ minds. Swimming, with its emphasis on world records, is one such 
sport. One of the biggest arguments against the LZR technologies is that it skews an 
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even comparison between the records set before the technology and those set with it. In 
fact, once the technologies were banned in professional competitions, the debate began 
over how the records set during the “technology doping” age should be handled. One 
popular suggestion (borrowed from baseball) was to place an asterisk by all the records 
set between 2008-2009. The problem here is that any thoughts of an equal comparison 
between today’s athletes and those of the past is always a fiction. According to Michael 
Bond in a New Scientist article titled “Should technology be allowed to tumble records?”: 
You could argue that technological "fixes" like this diminish the value of 
modern sporting records, making it unfair to compare the performances of 
this year's athletes with those through history. Some critics have 
suggested, for example, that since the reduced friction suits used by 
runners and swimmers give them an undeniable advantage over previous 
competitors, their race times should be adjusted downwards to reflect this. 
The problem with this line of reasoning is that there is no end to it. 
Technology—science too—has always been part of sport, from the design 
of runners’ shoes and aerodynamic bikes to the development of improved 
training regimes and performance-enhancing diets. What matters is not 
whether today's athletes have an unfair advantage, but how they use 
what's available to them—so long as it's within the rules. 
 
An excellent example of this comes again from the Beijing Olympics. Before the 
swimsuits’ significance became apparent (not until the World Championships the 
following year), a lot of attention was paid to the technology behind Beijing’s Olympic 
swimming pool, often referred to as the Water Cube and given the moniker “the world’s 
fastest pool.” The pool’s architecture, which is deeper and wider than any other 
competitive pool, was designed to help dissipate the turbulence caused by a swimmer’s 
movements, and the result is less resistance in the water and faster times. Competitors 
of the past did not have the benefit of swimming in such a pool, but no one argued that 
asterisks should be placed by the records set in that environment.  
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 Drawing on Jeffrey Walker’s “The Body of Persuasion,” Scott describes an 
enthymeme as “a body of persuasion that presents a claim, foregrounds a stance, and 
motivates identification with that stance by invoking a chain of premises and cluster of 
value-charged proofs. The enthymeme’s force depends not on a strict sequence of 
deductive reasoning but on the persuasive power of a wider web of premises and 
appeals, not all of which are ‘logical’” (43-44). He goes on to liken an enthymeme to a 
topos in that it allows for certain arguments and not others, but it is different and more 
than a topos in that it “draws its force from the movement of an argumentative chain and 
its surrounding complex of appeals” (44). Like a more general mythology, the 
enthymeme often relies heavily on commonplaces and shifting, particular knowledges 
within its chain of associations.  
 The nostalgia enthymeme posits comparison as an essential part of sports. The 
argumentative chain could be diagrammed as something similar to (Fig. 10): 
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These arguments are echoed throughout PETs discourse, especially when there is 
some sort of controversy. In the Mitchell Report, which concerns steroid use in 
professional baseball and is one of the most influential documents written about PEDs 
in sports, the nostalgia enthymeme is drawn upon when it reads, “the illegal use of 
anabolic steroids, human growth hormone, and similar drugs poses a significant threat 
to the integrity of the game of baseball. The widespread use of these substances raises 
questions about the validity of records and their comparability across different eras” (4). 
Additionally, when Adlington was making her comments about the LZR suits in 
Sports produce 
statistics & 
records 
Athletic performance 
can be measured and 
compared beyond the 
confines of an 
individual event 
Comparison spurs 
greater achievement 
through competitive 
drive 
Records as a 
comparative tool are 
only useful if they 
are not subject to 
particular 
circumstance 
A sporting event is a way 
to compare two athletes 
(i.e. winner and loser) 
Technology can 
threaten comparison 
because the past 
athletes are not on a 
level playing field with 
current athletes 
 
Threats to the ability 
to compare are threats 
against the integrity of 
the sport 
 
Figure 10: Diagram of the nostalgia enthymeme when applied to sporting discourse 
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swimming, she added that, “I can remember watching when they were just in trunks and 
100 percent textile suits, whereas now it’s very, very different.”  The implication here is 
that swimming was better off before the current technological innovations. In both 
statements, the implicit claim is that sports lose value when the specific event is 
restricted to its own ends and no longer serves as a yardstick by which to compare 
athletic performance in general. In the Adlington quote, there is the additional nostalgic 
quality of longing for a simpler, more natural past. Perhaps we could say that the 
nostalgia enthymeme is a subset of the level-playing-field topos since it seeks to 
establish a balance between athletic performance from era to era.  
 However, this is an illusory comparison because the technology of today is never 
the same as the technology of the past, so the only way to feel that you can have a fair 
comparison between past athletic performances and current ones is to overlook the 
situatedness of embodiment and performance or to erase the role of technology in the 
history of sport. 
 Mythologies are marked by their disconnect from a clear situated history, their 
reliance on layered narratives and relational associations, and their existence as 
already present, completed knowledges. They function within a social language, but 
distort the role that discourse plays in shaping perception by oversimplifying complex 
relationships in favor of commonplaces. PETs discourse is consumed by disciplinary 
mythologies that stem from the fetishism of sports—sports as natural human endeavors, 
the antithesis to which is technology. As in most mythologies, there is a specious link 
between the reality of technology in sports and the perception held by the larger  
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discourse community. Only by rearticulating this relationship can we challenge the  
disciplinary mythologies that shape our understanding of PETs.  
 128 
CHAPTER 5 
 
This dissertation attempts to make several contributions, both in rhetorical theory 
and analysis and in the cultural theory of sports. The earlier chapters attempted both of 
these tasks simultaneously, but in this final chapter, I will tease out the primary threads 
of each and eventually explore what a rearticulation of the relationship between PETs 
and sports competition could look like when applying a posthuman lens.  
 
Methodological Contributions 
 
An early goal of this project was to extend the rhetorical-cultural method first 
articulated in Scott to the subject of sports culture. As discussed in the introduction, 
there are a small but crucial number of texts that develop what I would consider a 
cultural analysis of the relationship between technology and sports, and I have drawn 
on them throughout this project (Shogan, 1999; Pronger, 2002; Magdalinski, 2009). 
However, I am unaware of any published research that applies a rhetorical methodology 
to PETs. Yet PETs seem particularly well suited for some form of rhetorical analysis 
because the understandings, definitions, and boundaries are rarely articulated explicitly 
by sports media and other actors even though they are enacted regularly through rules, 
sports commentary, and social interactions. Rhetorical analysis has the advantage of 
tracking these shifting discourses through multiple disciplines, stakeholders, and 
mediums.  
One complication for such an analysis is the multitude of sports competitions, 
PETs, and sport discourses. Each sport deals with technology in a different way and 
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negotiates those relationships through any number of rhetorical situations. To attempt 
what would be considered a traditional rhetorical approach (i.e., close reading of a 
specific text or event) would only have limited usefulness as it would speak to only a 
very narrow swath of PETs circumstances. For instance, we might be able to analyze 
documents related to swimming and technology, but those conclusions would not 
necessarily apply to NASCAR or football or rugby because technology is used by and 
incorporated into each sport in very different ways. Despite this challenge, my project 
was intended to make some observations about PETs in sports competition more 
generally. In other words, although every sport is different and uses technology in a 
variety of ways, I was attempting to show that there are underlying assumptions and 
perceptions about sports competition that underscore most sports and transcend 
individual sporting boundaries. These are notions about the nature of modern human 
competition, and the rhetorical-cultural method developed in Scott seems ideally suited 
for examining sport/technology interactions in this broader cultural domain. To focus 
only on the discourse would fail to address the many actors (athletes, coaches, 
commentators, fans, etc.) and actants (equipment, rules, techniques, etc.) that make up 
crucial elements of the cultural circuit relevant to PETs. An analytical method that is 
focused less on the discourse of individual sports and is instead focused on how these 
conversations about sports and technology get rearticulated and transformed as they 
move across culture is better suited to the purposes of this project; the rhetorical-
cultural method accomplishes this goal, and its usefulness for this kind of analysis 
should be acknowledged by scholars interested in broadening the applicability of either 
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rhetorical or cultural analysis. My project was an attempt to demonstrate that 
usefulness.  
Additionally, my project attempted to build a new theoretical framework for 
looking at how some discourse—and as a result, perceptions—are formed through a 
layering process that often remains unarticulated and unexamined. Derived first from 
Foucault’s disciplinary power and then Scott’s disciplinary rhetoric, I created the term 
disciplinary mythologies to emphasize this formative layering effect. Essentially, a 
disciplinary mythology is a discrete unit of persuasion that both constructs and 
constitutes claims by drawing upon layered narratives and shifting associations that lose 
their context when entering the realm of myth. Mythologies mask complex relationships 
by burying them underneath a simplified “truth;” they replace a critical analysis with what 
is already “known” in society. This is a particularly useful framework for exposing the 
types of underlying assumptions that I see as driving cultural attitudes and decisions 
about PETs. My analysis of technological doping in Chapter 4 was an attempt to 
develop the term disciplinary mythology within the context of PETs. In the case of the 
LZR swimming suits, arguments about whether to keep or ban the technology often 
centered around doping mythology despite the fact that the LZR and similar suits 
shared little in common with illicit PEDs. As I showed, disciplinary myths are similar to 
black boxes in that they replace complex relationships with a simplified understanding. 
They both restrict lines of inquiry and obscure the underlying assumptions that inform 
them. Although the LZR swimsuits were originally black boxed (subsumed into the sport 
social language that often attempts to gloss over technology’s role in sports), the 
dramatic effect they had on swimming performance forced the black box open and lead 
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to a feedback loop that brought it back to the start of the black boxing process where a 
technology is deemed either appropriate or unfair and unethical. At this point, the 
popular discourse lumped the LZR together with doping discourse, which drew on the 
mythology surrounding doping that has evolved since the 1960s, and the eventual result 
was that the technology was deemed unfair and unethical and led to its being banned. 
Disciplinary mythology engages in boundary formation, but it is a bricolage construction 
pieced together from narratives already present in the culture and absent from their 
historical and contextual groundings.  
 Disciplinary mythologies could be used to frame analysis of many discourses 
within sport. I identified two specific disciplinary mythologies in Chapter 4—the-level-
playing-field topos and the nostalgia enthymeme. Although they are particularly relevant 
to arguments pertaining to PETs, they could also be applied to other debates within 
sports discourse. Take, for example, the debate over whether NCAA football and 
basketball players should receive payment for playing. Depending on which side of the 
argument a claim falls, it often draws on one or the other disciplinary mythology. For 
those arguing that players should not be paid, claims about amateurism and the 
integrity of the game pull on nostalgic comparisons to the past. For those who feel 
players should be compensated monetarily because of how much money the school 
makes off of these athletes, a level-playing-field topos often is used to show the 
imbalance between the two factions. Additionally, disciplinary mythologies (both the 
ones I have identified and others not identified) could be used to frame analysis of 
issues outside the sports world. The purpose of the disciplinary-mythology lens is to dig 
below the individual texts and search out the threads that influence those texts and yet 
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remain unarticulated. In that way, it is fulfilling the objective of a rhetorical-cultural 
method in that it emphasizes the interrelatedness of discourse with other cultural forces 
and material entities.  
 
Cultural Theory of Sports Contributions 
 
 The methodological approach I used led to the contributions I was able to make 
toward a cultural theory of sports. Although there are a handful of texts that analyze the 
relationship between sports and technology using a cultural-theory framework, none 
could be said to draw explicitly on a methodology stemming from rhetorical theory. 
Drawing upon rhetorical theorists, primarily Bakhtin and Burke, I attempted to show how 
PETs discourse stems from a sports social language that is heavily rooted in a 
humanistic fetishism of sports, and that these pious relationships create ruts in our 
thinking that both conditions and is conditioned by the resulting discourse. And the sport 
social language has real-world consequences on sport, affecting everything from rules 
to equipment to media coverage to social implications.  
 In Chapter 2, I made the connection between this fetishism of sports and a sports 
social language that is steeped in humanism, and in Chapter 4, I strived to show how 
the backlash against the LZR suits was in large part because they forced us to question 
this humanism. The notion that technology could infringe on a sport assumes that there 
is some essential quality to sport that is singularly flesh-based, effectively maintaining 
and perpetuating the human/machine dichotomy. What posthumanism and embodiment 
theories demonstrate is that humans are never separable from their tools or 
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technologies. As Haraway claims, we have always been cyborgs, and “the polemical 
advantage of the cyborg, for Haraway, is that it resists being encoded as natural. ‘The 
cyborg skips the step of original unity, of identification with nature in the Western 
sense’” (Bukatman 102). There is nothing “natural” about modern swimming 
competitions, and certainly nothing natural about any modern professional sport. When I 
began this project, one hypothesis I sought to examine was whether or not there was a 
boundary stemming from the humanist sport social language that placed interior 
technologies as opposed to exterior technologies in a more gray area ethically. This is 
something that requires further research; however, in the case of the ‘technological 
doping’ arguments, we see that the technology’s exteriority did not make it immune to 
controversy and eventual banning. Magdalinski makes the argument that the LZR’s 
exteriority is what allowed it to become acceptable within the sport, but she was writing 
that before the records started falling and the technology came under scrutiny once 
again. Instead, what we see in this particular case is that the controversy that eventually 
led to the technology being banned occurred when the black box was reopened. 
Initially, the exteriority may have been a key factor in allowing the LZR to pass through 
the ‘unfair’ and ‘unnatural’ barriers and make it into the black box, but once the 
technology exerted itself into the swimming discourse, thus forcing the black box back 
open, the boundary that got crossed was one of effect rather than interior versus 
exterior. It was still a humanist boundary, but one that transgresses the humanist ideals 
of sport as a purely natural human endeavor.  
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As we move forward from this project, an important question would be where do 
we go from here? Understanding how the sport social language functions and 
recognizing that it is drawing upon humanistic attitudes only opens the door to 
rearticulating the relationship between sports and technology. According to Scott, “the 
ultimate aim of a rhetorical-cultural study is ethical intervention, however tentative and 
local […] rhetorical analysis can and should have a political role in reshaping the 
discursive practices it studies” (229). Although at this early stage making concrete 
recommendations may give way to unpacking, revealing, and creating better 
understandings that can inform deliberations in sports discourse, the analysis should 
lead to some kind of change. Therefore, two important questions that need to be 
addressed at the end of this study are whether there needs to be a change in how 
society perceives the relationship between technology and sports, and how could a 
better understanding of disciplinary mythologies enable a more informed rule-making for 
competition for different sports? If a change does need to occur, in what direction 
should that change take us?  
My intention throughout this project has been to try and demonstrate that a 
change does need to occur. In her closing chapter, Magdalinski offers a useful 
perspective on the current confusion in sports when she says,  
Modern sport is a paradox. It seeks to surpass established records 
with astonishing performances that push the body beyond its current limits 
[…] At the same time, sport adheres to strict, and, for some, archaic, 
principles that rely on conservative notions of chivalry, amateurism and 
gentlemanliness. These are seemingly at odds with the realities of 
contemporary elite and professional sport, and the conflict between these 
priorities has generated a series of moral panics (157). 
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It would seem that these moral panics would only increase as technology advances, 
and since sports technology is a multibillion dollar a year industry, there does not 
appear to be any desire to move toward a more “pure” humanistic competition (i.e., one 
without technology). This really is not possible anyway. Magdalinski goes on to say, “an 
aversion to performance technologies, as substances and techniques, applied directly 
to the athletic body or utilised within the conduct of sport for the sole purpose of 
enhancing performance, represent, for many, the most exigent crisis currently facing 
sport” (157). There are no easy solutions to address the relationship between sports 
and technology, but if, as many claim, performance enhancement is the most significant 
crisis that sports are facing, continuing to use the same PETs discourse that contributes 
to these moral panics seems ineffective.  
  
Transitioning to the Posthuman 
 
Based on the rhetorical-cultural analysis I conducted in this project, a useful first 
step would be to reconfigure the notion of the human and technology using a 
posthuman perspective. If, as I have claimed, PETs discourse is steeped in a humanism 
that attempts to minimize or ignore the role of technology in sports, posthumanism 
offers a framework for conceiving of humans and machine in a co-constituting 
relationship. As Katherine Hayles has claimed about the posthuman view,  
[The posthuman] thinks of the body as the original prosthesis we all learn 
to manipulate, so that extending or replacing the body with other 
prostheses becomes a continuation of a process that began before we 
were born […] the posthuman view configures human being so that it can 
be seamlessly articulated with intelligent machines. In the posthuman, 
there are no essential differences or absolute demarcations between 
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bodily existence and [technologies]” (3).  
 
Returning to the swimming example from Chapter 4, if we rearticulate the discourse to 
align with posthumanism, something like the LZR suit becomes an appendage of the 
body, a new layer that makes the body more efficient and effective in the water. The 
LZR is simply an extension, the next evolutionary step in a process that began with 
stroke and technique development—making the human body faster in the water. 
Of course, a reframing such as this may evoke in many a deep, humanistic 
outcry that technology is corrupting the purity of human competition. This fear that 
technology will make the competition moot leads to a common slippery slope fallacy—
“where will it end?” Chase characterizes this argument when he lists as one of his five 
reasons for banning the high-tech LZR suits as, “Technology is only going to get better. 
Where does this end? What happens if TYR makes a suit that fully repels water and 
allows a swimmer to float across the water like a hoverboard?” (“5 Reasons”). His 
underlying question about the end goal of technology in sports is legitimate, but the way 
he framed it and the impetus for it is not. Clearly, there have to be some restrictions on 
technology in the sport; otherwise, what would stop athletes from strapping a propeller 
to their back and motoring across the pool? When the act of swimming is secondary to 
the technology, there is a clear problem. Currently, much of sports discourse has the 
pendulum swung all the way to the humanist side where technology is ignored or at best 
placed in a subsidiary role. However, sports seem to lose their significance if the 
pendulum swings to the other extreme where the human becomes secondary to the 
technology. This is not an issue of ethical boundaries as I do not feel either side of the 
spectrum is more or less ethical in the sense that it is right or wrong. Instead, this is an 
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issue of taking a realistic approach to what we want sports to measure. Yes, sports are 
a spectacle; they are about entertainment; however, at their core they are also a way to 
measure athletic achievement. Otherwise, sports would not need points and winners 
and losers; they would just be an artistic performance. Much of sports discourse is 
unrealistic because it attempts to ignore and minimize the role of technology in the 
competition, instead opting for a fantasy of pure and natural human achievement. But 
we also do not desire a scenario where technology takes over and what we are 
measuring is technological innovation without the athlete being a significant factor. 
Sports still need to be about the athletes, not just the engineers. What would be more 
desirable is a posthuman approach that seeks a symbiosis between human and 
machine, one where technology is used—and its role is recognized—to extend and 
improve human athletic performance. Chase’s argument, which epitomizes a common 
argumentative thread against technology in sports, comes from a fear of all technology 
and its assault on the essentialist myth. It is the fear of the “rabbit hole,” the unknowing 
of where things will go from here. Certainly, eliminating the use of technology all 
together will result in the end of that fear…at least until a new technology comes around 
that threatens the essentialist myth, and there is bound to be another technology. The 
better way to balance technology in sports is first to articulate the relationship between 
humans and technology, and that should come from a posthumanistic perspective. If we 
understand that technology is not a threat to the essentialist human because there is in 
fact no essential human that can be articulated without technology, then we are free to 
move forward and address how we want technology to be used in a particular sport. I 
would argue that this should be accomplished from a communitarian perspective, 
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meaning that the key stakeholders for each sport would negotiate what they want the 
end product to be for the competition, and this would include an articulation of how and 
what technology should be used to facilitate the process. For swimming, we could 
express this as technology is meant to help swimmers become more effective and 
efficient in the water. With that articulation, the human body becomes the central 
technology to be mastered within swimming.  
One ethical line that I would draw would have to do with player safety. Athletes 
are known to be highly driven individuals, and that drive can sometimes push them to 
make choices in training or competition that would threaten their own safety or that of 
another competitor. Although I am arguing for a rearticulation of how we approach 
sports and PETs, including PEDs, I am not claiming that we should ignore ethical 
behavior and precautions when it comes to health and safety. Some PEDs have been 
shown to be dangerous, especially when used without proper monitoring by a physician. 
For that reason, certain PEDs should be regulated or banned from sports, but not 
strictly because there is a fear that they are effecting performance and disrupting the 
level-playing-field topos. However, clearly there is some risk involved in any sport, and 
the sport stakeholders have often determined that removing all risk from the given sport 
would adversely effect the end product they want to showcase (otherwise, there would 
be no hitting in either American football or hockey). What should be sought is 
equilibrium between safety and spectacle, and if a PED can be shown to have minimal 
health risks, a posthuman perspective would offer fewer objections to incorporating that 
technology into sporting competition.  
Additionally, part of transitioning to the posthuman would be to define technology 
 139 
so that it refers to all aspects of technological advance, not just equipment or gadgets, 
which is how it is often envisioned. This would include such things as training 
techniques, apparel, player tracking tools, film to breakdown athlete performance and 
competitor strategies, dietary sciences, and a host of other technologies that are 
commonly ignored when considering PETs. The posthuman is not only more historically 
and semiotically accurate, but it also allows for technology and the human to advance 
without the artificial essentialist restrictions. Taking this step makes visible many of the 
metaphors and myths that underlie modern sports, and it allows for a clear articulation 
of the interweaved relationship between humans and technology, effectively shattering 
the human/machine dichotomy that influences our perceptions of PETs in sports.  
 Furthermore (and probably more difficult), I would want to express the 
situatedness of all phenomenological experience, including sports. Although debating 
who the most accomplished swimmer of all time may be an enjoyable rhetorical 
experience, unless it is clear that the entire debate is a fiction based on a false and 
impossible comparison, the desire to maintain balance between the past and present 
will restrict the progress that sports can make and perpetuate the human/machine 
dichotomy.  
 Determining the ramifications of such a rearticulation on sports as a whole is 
difficult. Not only is humanism deeply embedded in sports discourses, but also the 
remnants of humanism are woven throughout much of larger cultural discourse. Those 
strands are not easily disentangled. However, when it comes to PETs discourse 
specifically, we might point to a few possible implications. First, technology would no 
longer be viewed as the antithesis to “pure” sports, and this would result in more 
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nuanced conversations about what each sport wants to achieve through the use of 
technology. With this kind of articulation, many specific technologies—such as the LZR 
suits and the Spira shoes—would be more likely to become accepted into the sport. 
Additionally, although debates about ethical use and health concerns will still occur, the 
door may be opened for selected PEDs to become incorporated into sports. As we saw 
with the Deford article in Chapter 2, arguments against PEDs often claim that the drugs 
cheapen the sport by adding artifice to what would otherwise be natural competition. 
Rearticulating the PETs conversation within a posthuman framework effectively disrupts 
the “natural” discourse, emphasizing the cyborg construction of the human and human 
sports.  
 Disrupting the “natural” discourse would have an effect on another area of the 
technology in sports conversation that I have not addressed as thoroughly up to this 
point—disability and technology in sports. Shogan argues convincingly in her chapter 
“Hybrid Athletes” that participants in sports that require a technology (e.g. a synthetic 
limb) in order to compete in “normal” competition are constructed as “unnatural” as 
opposed to the “natural” able-bodied participant (71). As I discussed previously, the 
early rulings that prohibited Oscar Pistorius from competing in able-bodied competition 
bear this out. His running blades where rhetorically constructed as a competitive 
advantage, and it took lengthy court proceedings before these claims were thrown out. 
Shogan goes on to argue that the PED-related claims about what is unnatural and 
unethical create category confusion and allow for arguments that position the disabled 
athlete as unnatural and unable to compete against athletes only using “natural” 
technologies (i.e., able-bodied athletes). Although Shogan does not use the term 
 141 
posthumanism specifically, she echoes my argument for a rearticulation away from the 
humanistic view when she says,  
When, however, it is recognized that all participants rely on technological 
intervention as they aim to meet or surpass the standards or norms for 
their activities, not only is the dichotomy between the ‘natural’ able-bodied 
participant and the ‘unnatural’ disabled participant called into question, 
there is potential to disrupt the specious link that is sometimes made 
between technological intervention and ethical impropriety. Some 
technologies such as performance enhancing drugs are arguably ethically 
problematic, but linking technology to the ‘unnatural’ and then to the 
unethical not only commits the ‘naturalistic fallacy,’ […] it undermines 
physical activity for people with disabilities who rely on technology (71-71).  
 
As I have attempted to show, and I think Shogan would agree, a rearticulaiton of 
the PETs conversation using a posthuman perspective would be an effective way to 
disrupt the natural/unnatural discourse that permeates not only PETs conversation, but 
sports discourse as a whole. Although I have cited a few examples of how this could 
change the dialogue, the ramifications of this type of reframing would be far-reaching 
and complex. Sports social language, more so than many other social languages, is 
enmeshed with humanism, placing technology as an interloper that must, when its 
presence becomes apparent, be guarded against and, when its presence is ignored, 
remains black boxed and out of sight. However, technology is not going away, and in 
the world of high-performance competitions where technology is increasingly relied 
upon to dissect the professional athlete in an effort to improve performance, the 
paradox of modern sports will become increasingly difficult to maintain. For this reason, 
rearticulating the PETs discourse is a productive way to move forward. 
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